The first major misconception, Stephen argued, is the belief that centralized security teams can act as bottlenecks in the delivery path of application teams without blocking them. This is a fundamental miscalculation of scale factors. He highlighted a stark reality: the ratio of application engineers to cloud security specialists is often severely imbalanced, sometimes as skewed as 50:1. Furthermore, these cloud security specialists might not even reside within a dedicated security team, exacerbating the problem.
The implication here is profound: expecting a handful of security experts to manually review and approve every security-related change across dozens or hundreds of application teams is simply unsustainable. If security specialists are placed directly in the operational path, they become responsible for reviewing multiple changes daily - two, three, or even five changes per day.
Failure to respond within a reasonable timeframe, such as four business hours, inevitably blocks delivery, creates immense stress for the security team, and significantly slows down the entire organization. This reactive, gatekeeper model is not only inefficient but ultimately detrimental to organizational agility and velocity.
Perhaps the most crucial misconception Stephen identified is a strategic error in being "too literal about least privilege." While the principle of least privilege—granting only the minimum permissions necessary for a user or service to perform its function—is foundational to security, its overly literal interpretation can become a significant impediment at scale.
Stephen metaphorically referred to this literal interpretation as "CodeGolf," where security practitioners attempt to remove "every last permission." This approach fails to acknowledge the sheer scale of modern cloud environments. Cloud providers like AWS now boast over 10,000 to 17,000 individual permissions. In an organization with hundreds of "principles" (users, roles, services) and potentially hundreds of data sources, attempting to "artisanally craft" bespoke policies for each individual permission becomes humanly impossible and deeply impractical.
We agreed with Stephen that while least privilege is paramount, its implementation must be custom-tailored to the organization's specific scale and context. Leaders often aspire to least privilege without fully defining what it means in a scalable, actionable sense. Are they seeking to control access at the granularity of individual permissions, or are they more interested in a higher-level "auditor level language" like "can the principal administer the resource," "read its configuration," "read data," "write data," or "delete data"?
Stephen stressed that without a clear, defined understanding of least privilege that accounts for scale, organizations fall into the trap of "least privileged golf," losing out on the significant risk reduction achievable with coarser abstractions that are much easier to manage.