CVE-2026-99179
NoneCVSS
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EPSS
0.2%
Published
Oct 28, 2026
CISA due date
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Cloudanix analysis
A bug in the Linux kernel lets any logged-in user crash the entire computer by running two operations at the same time.
- Exploitation
- Local Privilege
- Attacker needs
- Local User
- Complexity
- Moderate
- Impact
- Denial Of Service
- Component
- OS kernel
- Class
- Race Condition
- Remediation
- Patch
- Effort
- Medium
- Patch risk
- Low
What it actually does
Race condition in watch_queue_set_size() and post_one_notification() where plain stores to wqueue->notes, notes_bitmap, nr_pages and nr_notes are not ordered against plain loads under a separate lock, allowing post_one_notification() to observe nr_notes > 0 while notes remains NULL and dereference notes[0].
Why it matters to the business
Unprivileged local users can trigger a kernel NULL pointer dereference leading to immediate panic and full system crash on Linux hosts, disrupting all workloads and services until reboot.
How an attack unfolds
An attacker creates a notification pipe, attaches a watch to one of their own keys via keyctl_watch_key(), then concurrently issues IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE on the pipe from one CPU while performing KEYCTL_SETPERM on the key from another CPU; the missing memory ordering lets the notification path read a stale nr_notes value and dereference a still-NULL notes array.
How to fix it
Apply the upstream fix that publishes nr_notes last via smp_store_release() and reads it once via smp_load_acquire() in post_one_notification(); rebuild and reboot onto the patched kernel.
How to confirm the fix worked
Verify the smp_store_release/smp_load_acquire change is present in watch_queue.c, confirm the race window is closed by code inspection, and test that concurrent watch attachment plus size setting no longer produces NULL dereferences.
Typical attack path
- Create a watch_queue pipe and call keyctl_watch_key() to attach it to a key before sizing.
- From a second thread or CPU, race ioctl(IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE) against keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM) on the watched key.
- post_one_notification() reads nr_notes > 0, passes bounds check, then dereferences the still-NULL notes pointer.
- Kernel oops in post_one_notification triggers panic.
How to detect it
Search kernel logs and crash dumps for the exact BUG line 'kernel NULL pointer dereference' together with the call trace containing post_one_notification, __post_watch_notification, and keyctl_setperm_key; correlate with processes issuing watch_queue ioctls and keyctl syscalls around the same timestamp.
- BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
- RIP: 0010:post_one_notification.isra.0+0xa2/0x1e0
- Call Trace: __post_watch_notification+0x148/0x180 keyctl_setperm_key+0x119/0x130
- watch_queue_set_size
What your security team should do
- Patch and reboot all Linux systems within the next maintenance window given the one-day publication age and reliable unprivileged trigger.
- Add kernel oops monitoring for post_one_notification NULL dereferences to detect attempted exploitation.
- Restrict unprivileged keyctl and watch_queue usage via SELinux/AppArmor or seccomp where workloads permit.
The record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watch_queue: Fix note pool publication race in watch_queue_set_size() There is a race between watch_queue_set_size() and post_one_notification(). watch_queue_set_size() publishes wqueue->notes, notes_bitmap, nr_pages and nr_notes with plain stores, and post_one_notification() reads them with plain loads under a different lock, so nothing orders the four stores against the poster's loads: depending on the build, notes can be stored last (gcc 14 on x86-64 does this). Since keyctl_watch_key() lets a watch attach to a queue before it is sized, post_one_notification() can already be running on another CPU at that moment: it reads nr_notes > 0, passes its bounds check, and then reads notes while it is still NULL, dereferencing notes[0]. An unprivileged user triggers this reliably by watching one of its own keys through a notification pipe and racing ioctl(IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE) on that pipe against keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM) on the key from another CPU, triggering: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:post_one_notification.isra.0+0xa2/0x1e0 Call Trace: __post_watch_notification+0x148/0x180 keyctl_setperm_key+0x119/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x108/0x4c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Fix this by publishing nr_notes last with smp_store_release(), and by reading it once with smp_load_acquire() in post_one_notification() before the bitmap and the page array are touched. A poster that observes a non-zero nr_notes then also observes the pool behind it; one that observes zero drops the notification as before.
Affected packages
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