CVE-2026-99112
NoneCVSS
—
EPSS
0.2%
Published
Oct 28, 2026
CISA due date
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Cloudanix analysis
A bug in how the Linux kernel checks network traffic rules could let an attacker with administrative network rights read memory they should not access or cause the system to crash.
- Exploitation
- Local Privilege
- Attacker needs
- Low Privilege
- Complexity
- Moderate
- Impact
- Data Exposure
- Component
- OS kernel
- Class
- Memory Corruption
- Remediation
- Upgrade
- Effort
- Medium
- Patch risk
- Low
What it actually does
Out-of-bounds read in cls_flower netlink attribute parsing: nla_next() advances the mask pointer based on key attribute count rather than mask attributes; missing validation on the advanced pointer allows nla_type() and nla_parse_nested_deprecated() to read past the mask payload when residue bytes or non-aligned lengths leave msk_depth != 0, producing KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read in __nla_validate_parse from fl_change().
Why it matters to the business
Systems performing traffic classification with the flower classifier may experience kernel crashes or limited memory disclosure; the issue affects any distribution or appliance using recent Linux kernels with net/sched cls_flower enabled, increasing operational risk for network infrastructure until patched.
How an attack unfolds
An attacker with CAP_NET_ADMIN sends a crafted RTM_NEWTFILTER netlink message containing a flower filter with tunnel-option attributes whose mask carries one valid attribute plus trailing residue bytes; the kernel iterates keys with nla_for_each_attr while the mask cursor skips validation, causing nla_parse_nested_deprecated to dereference attacker-controlled lengths beyond the mask buffer.
How to fix it
Apply the upstream fix that adds nla_ok() validation on the mask pointer returned by nla_next() inside fl_set_enc_opt and sibling helpers; rebuild and deploy kernels containing commit that rejects the filter with -EINVAL when the advanced mask pointer fails validation while msk_depth remains non-zero.
How to confirm the fix worked
Confirm the patch is present by inspecting the cls_flower source for the added nla_ok() guard after nla_next(); test by replaying a malformed mask attribute via tc or netlink and verifying -EINVAL is returned instead of proceeding to nla_parse_nested_deprecated.
Typical attack path
- Obtain CAP_NET_ADMIN or equivalent on a system exposing netlink route sockets
- Construct RTM_NEWTFILTER message with cls_flower and tunnel encap options
- Craft mask nested attributes with valid length plus 1-3 residue bytes or misaligned lengths
- Send the message via netlink; kernel performs fl_set_enc_opt and fl_set_geneve_opt without exhausting msk_depth check
- Trigger out-of-bounds read during nla_parse_nested_deprecated inside fl_change
How to detect it
Search kernel logs for KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read originating from __nla_validate_parse called via fl_change; inspect audit logs for unusual RTM_NEWTFILTER messages containing flower classifiers with tunnel encap options; correlate with processes invoking tc or direct netlink route sockets.
What your security team should do
- Prioritize kernel updates on any host or appliance that exposes netlink to untrusted users or containers
- Restrict CAP_NET_ADMIN via seccomp, user namespaces, or container policies where flower classifier is not required
- Monitor for kernel oops or KASAN reports referencing __nla_validate_parse and fl_change
- Audit use of tc flower filters with tunnel options in production configurations
The record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_flower: validate mask pointer after nla_next() fl_set_enc_opt() iterates the key's nested tunnel-option attributes with nla_for_each_attr() while advancing a single mask pointer via nla_next() at the bottom of each loop, so the mask cursor is driven by the number of key attributes rather than by the mask's own attributes. The nla_ok() added by commit c96adff956191 ("cls_flower: call nla_ok() before nla_next()") only validates the mask pointer that was just consumed; the pointer produced by nla_next() is used by the next iteration (fl_set_geneve_opt() and siblings) without any validation. The mask's nested attributes are validated with NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL, which merely warns on trailing bytes that do not form a complete attribute. A mask carrying one valid attribute plus 1-3 residue bytes (or a non-aligned attribute length making msk_depth negative) therefore reaches the next iteration with msk_depth != 0, so neither the !msk_depth check in fl_set_enc_opt() nor the !depth check in the per-type helpers fires. nla_type() then reads past the mask payload and nla_parse_nested_deprecated() iterates with an nla_len taken from those bytes, reading well beyond the mask attribute (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds read in __nla_validate_parse from fl_change()). Validate the advanced mask pointer as well: when the mask is not legitimately exhausted (msk_depth != 0) and the new pointer fails nla_ok(), reject the filter with -EINVAL. An exactly exhausted mask still skips the check, preserving exact-match behaviour for the remaining key attributes.
Affected packages
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