CVE-2026-99069
NoneCVSS
—
EPSS
0.2%
Published
Oct 23, 2026
CISA due date
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Cloudanix analysis
A programming mistake in the code that manages certain USB remote controls can make the computer crash when those controls are used.
- Exploitation
- Local Privilege
- Attacker needs
- Local User
- Complexity
- Moderate
- Impact
- Denial Of Service
- Component
- OS kernel
- Class
- Memory Corruption
- Remediation
- Upgrade
- Effort
- Medium
- Patch risk
- Low
What it actually does
Type confusion in ati_remote2 sysfs attribute handlers where to_usb_device() is called on a struct usb_interface pointer, producing an invalid usb_device pointer and enabling memory corruption on read/write to channel_mask or mode_mask attributes.
Why it matters to the business
Potential kernel crashes or memory corruption on systems with the affected USB remote control hardware, leading to instability or denial of service for users relying on that input device.
How an attack unfolds
A local attacker interacts with the exposed sysfs attributes on the usb_interface; the unchanged callbacks perform the wrong device-type cast, dereference the invalid pointer, and trigger memory corruption that may be leveraged for further impact.
How to fix it
Apply the upstream kernel patch that replaces to_usb_device() with to_usb_interface() in the attribute show/store callbacks and rebuild or update to the fixed kernel release.
How to confirm the fix worked
Inspect the ati_remote2 driver source for use of to_usb_interface() in the attribute handlers or confirm the running kernel contains the commit titled 'Input: ati_remote2 - fix type confusion in device attribute handlers'.
Typical attack path
- Obtain local shell or user context on the target host
- Locate the ati_remote2 usb_interface sysfs directory
- Read or write the channel_mask or mode_mask attribute files
- Trigger invalid pointer dereference and memory corruption
How to detect it
Review kernel logs (dmesg, /var/log/kern.log) for oops, warnings, or stack traces referencing ati_remote2 attribute handlers or usb device type conversions shortly after sysfs access to the device.
What your security team should do
- Prioritize kernel update on any system exposing the ati_remote2 driver
- If the hardware is not required, blacklist the module to reduce attack surface
- Monitor kernel logs for oops or warnings mentioning ati_remote2 or usb_interface attribute handling
The record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: ati_remote2 - fix type confusion in device attribute handlers Previously, the channel_mask and mode_mask attributes were registered on the parent usb_device via sysfs_create_group(). When commit b20d6bf8014b ("Input: ati-remote2 - use driver core to instantiate device attributes") converted the driver to let the driver core manage them via dev_groups in struct usb_driver, the attributes moved to the bound usb_interface devices, but the show and store callbacks were not updated accordingly. As a result, the callbacks still invoked to_usb_device() on a device pointer belonging to a struct usb_interface, producing an invalid usb_device pointer. Use to_usb_interface() directly in the attribute handlers to obtain the interface and its driver data.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Introduced | Fixed |
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