Cloudanix VulnDB

CVE-2026-98980

High · 8.8

CVSS

8.8

EPSS

0.2%

Published

Oct 23, 2026

CISA due date

—

Cloudanix analysis

Schedule a fix SSVC: Track

A timing flaw in the Linux kernel can let a local user briefly see files that should stay hidden behind mounts when files are being deleted at the same moment.

Exploitation
Local Privilege
Attacker needs
Low Privilege
Complexity
Moderate
Impact
Data Exposure
Component
OS kernel
Class
Race Condition
Remediation
Upgrade
Effort
Medium
Patch risk
Medium

What it actually does

Race condition in Linux kernel refwalk pathname resolution allows a dentry marked DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT after unlink to be accepted after mounts are detached, exposing the underlying file content instead of ENOENT.

Why it matters to the business

Attackers on the same system can read files that should remain hidden behind mounts during brief windows created by concurrent unlinks, potentially disclosing sensitive data or bypassing access controls on Linux hosts.

How an attack unfolds

Attacker prepares a tmpfs with a mounted-over file and a detached mount tree copy, then spawns concurrent openat2 walkers while rapidly unlinking the covered entry; the refwalk misses the mount detachment and reads the now-unmounted underlying content.

How to fix it

Upgrade the Linux kernel to a version containing the referenced namei fix that checks DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT after step_into in refwalk; rebuild and reboot affected systems.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the kernel source contains the DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT check in step_into_slowpath and __follow_mount_rcu handling; test with the provided unlink_covered reproducer to verify no secret reads occur.

Typical attack path

  1. Create tmpfs and file, bind mount over it via open_tree clone
  2. Spawn multiple lockless walkers using openat2(RESOLVE_CACHED) on the covered name
  3. Rapidly unlink the mountpoint entry while walkers are active
  4. Detect when walker reads secret content instead of ENOENT or the overlay
  5. Repeat to increase probability within the narrow race window

How to detect it

Search kernel audit logs and strace output for sequences of openat2 or open followed immediately by unlink/rename on the same path; correlate with unexpected reads of files that should return ENOENT when covered by mounts.

What your security team should do

  • Prioritize kernel updates on multi-user and container hosts within the next 7 days given the local attack surface
  • Monitor for high-frequency unlink/rename activity on directories containing mountpoints
  • Restrict unprivileged mount and open_tree usage via LSM or seccomp where feasible
  • Review workloads that perform frequent file lifecycle operations under mounts

The record

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namei: don't reveal overmounted entries in refwalk In rcuwalk the dentry is validated before it is accepted. step_into() step_into() rechecks d_seq and __follow_mount_rcu() rechecks mount_lock. An entry that gets unlinked in between causes the lookup to retry and miss. A refwalk doesn't do this. lookup_fast() takes a reference on the hashed dentry and simply accepts it. So an unlink that happens after the reference was taken isn't seen by refwalk. That's fine for a simple file. We just happened to open it before it was unlinked, no problem. For a mountpoint and specifically a locked mountpoint it very much isn't. The unlink detaches all mounts and then removes the name. Any refwalk that hasn't traversed the mounts yet simply reveals the underlying entry. It's a very narrow window but it can be hit: reads of a covered file in 60 s, 3 walkers, ~15000 unlinks no widening 27 that step + 200 us 3741 See the appended patch for a more reliable reproducer. So check the entry after step_into(). unlink(), rmdir() and rename() mark the dentry with dont_mount() before they detach the mounts and remove the dentry. So a dentry that is marked with DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT and is unhashed by the time its mounts were looked at is a name that was unlinked under the refwalk. DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT is read after the mounts were looked up and it is set before they are detached by detach_mounts(). A refwalk that missed the mounts will see DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT. Plain d_unlinked() is fine. A rename takes the dentry off its hash chain but ___d_drop() leaves d_hash.pprev set. So only __d_drop() and a rename over the dentry unhash it. The only move that flips IS_ROOT splices in a disconnected alias. That doesn't have DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT set. Add the to step_into_slowpath(). ".." and LOOKUP_DOWN may legitimately land on an unhashed directory. A refwalk that crossed onto a mount has path.mnt different from nd->path.mnt. A dentry that a filesystem dropped on its own (d_invalidate(), d_drop()) doesn't have the flag set and is treated as before. // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * unlink_covered: unlink a file that is a mountpoint in a detached copy of * its mount, against walkers that open it through that copy. * * A is a tmpfs with the file f1 (content SECRET_F) and the plain file * MARK_A. A' is an open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) copy of A with MARK_A bound * on A'/f1, held through an O_PATH fd on its root once the tree fd is * closed. Walkers open f1 through that fd while the driver unlinks A/f1, * where nothing is mounted on it. A walker may read MARK_A or get ENOENT. * A read of SECRET_F is a hit: the name was found after its mount was * gone. The lockless walks use openat2(RESOLVE_CACHED). * * usage: unlink_covered [-t seconds] [-w walkers] */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stdatomic.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <linux/openat2.h> #ifndef __NR_open_tree #define __NR_open_tree 428 #endif #ifndef __NR_move_mount #define __NR_move_mount 429 #endif #ifndef __NR_openat2 #define __NR_openat2 437 #endif #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLONE #define OPEN_TREE_CLONE 1 #endif #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC #define OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC #endif #ifndef MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH #define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004 #endif #define WORK "/tmp/uc" #define ADIR WORK "/A" static int duration = 60, nwalkers = 3; static atomic_int stop, writer_waiting; static pthread_rwlock_t cur_lock = PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER; static int cur_fd = -1; /* the root of A', -1 while there is none */ static atomic_long n_unlink, n_walk, n_mark, n_enoent, n_othe ---truncated---

Affected packages

Ecosystem Package Introduced Fixed