CVE-2026-98697
NoneCVSS
—
EPSS
0.2%
Published
Oct 18, 2026
CISA due date
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Cloudanix analysis
A timing flaw in how the operating system cleans up USB device ID lists could let a local program leave behind a small amount of memory, potentially affecting stability until the system is restarted.
- Exploitation
- Local Privilege
- Attacker needs
- Local User
- Complexity
- Moderate
- Impact
- Data Exposure
- Component
- OS kernel
- Class
- Race Condition
- Remediation
- Upgrade
- Effort
- Medium
- Patch risk
- Low
What it actually does
Race condition in USB serial driver deregistration allows a concurrent write to the new_id sysfs attribute to add a dynamic ID after the driver has begun teardown but before dynamic IDs are freed, resulting in a leaked ID entry.
Why it matters to the business
Resource leaks and potential inconsistent driver state on systems that rely on dynamic USB serial device binding, which can degrade stability or require reboots in environments with frequent USB device attach/detach or driver reloads.
How an attack unfolds
An attacker with local access triggers rapid driver deregistration while simultaneously writing a crafted ID to the new_id attribute; if the write races past the deregistration point, the ID is added to a structure that is then freed, leaving a dangling reference that could be abused for further kernel memory manipulation.
How to fix it
Upgrade to a kernel containing the referenced fix that moves dynamic-ID freeing after driver deregistration and new_id attribute removal; rebuild and reboot with the patched kernel; avoid hot-unloading USB serial drivers until updated.
How to confirm the fix worked
Confirm the presence of the upstream commit that reorders dynamic-ID cleanup relative to driver deregistration; verify that writes to new_id after deregistration no longer succeed and that no orphaned IDs remain in memory after unload.
Typical attack path
- Obtain local unprivileged access on a vulnerable Linux kernel
- Identify or trigger USB serial driver load/unload cycle
- Race a write(2) to /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/.../new_id against the deregistration path
- Observe or leverage the resulting leaked dynamic ID structure for subsequent kernel exploitation
How to detect it
Review kernel logs for USB serial driver registration and deregistration sequences occurring in rapid succession; inspect sysfs writes to new_id attributes around driver unload events; look for memory-leak symptoms or oops reports referencing dynamic ID structures after USB serial driver removal.
What your security team should do
- Prioritize kernel updates on systems exposing USB serial devices or performing frequent driver reloads
- Restrict unprivileged write access to USB serial sysfs attributes via LSM or mount options where possible
- Monitor for unusual USB serial driver load/unload patterns in system logs
The record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: fix dynamic id driver deregistration race Only free the dynamic ids after having deregistered the driver and removed the "new_id" attribute to avoid leaking any id added by a racing write to the attribute.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Introduced | Fixed |
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