Cloudanix VulnDB

CVE-2026-98532

None

CVSS

—

EPSS

0.2%

Published

Oct 18, 2026

CISA due date

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Cloudanix analysis

Next patch cycle SSVC: Track

A bug in how Linux handles certain IPv6 packets can let specially crafted network traffic corrupt memory inside the kernel, potentially crashing systems that use Open vSwitch.

Exploitation
Remote Unauthenticated
Attacker needs
None
Complexity
Moderate
Impact
Remote Code Execution
Component
OS kernel
Class
Memory Corruption
Remediation
Upgrade
Effort
Medium
Patch risk
Low

What it actually does

ipv6_find_hdr() fails to validate that the offset computed from extension header lengths fits within skb->len, allowing an out-of-bounds value to be installed as the transport header; subsequent callers in openvswitch (update_ipv6_checksum, inet_proto_csum_replace16) then perform reads and writes beyond the allocated skbuff, producing slab use-after-free.

Why it matters to the business

Network traffic processed by systems using Open vSwitch can trigger kernel memory corruption, leading to crashes, potential remote code execution, or service outages on Linux hosts handling IPv6 packets.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker sends a crafted IPv6 packet containing an extension header chain whose declared lengths cause ipv6_find_hdr() to compute an offset beyond the actual packet data; openvswitch stores this invalid offset as the transport header and later invokes checksum replacement functions that dereference memory outside the skbuff, resulting in KASAN-detected slab corruption.

How to fix it

Apply the upstream kernel patch that adds an explicit bounds check inside ipv6_find_hdr() before returning the computed offset; rebuild and reboot to a fixed kernel version. Until patched, restrict IPv6 traffic through Open vSwitch or disable IPv6 extension header processing where feasible.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the running kernel contains the bounds check in ipv6_find_hdr(); attempt to replay a minimal malformed IPv6 packet and verify that -EBADMSG is returned instead of an out-of-bounds offset; monitor for absence of KASAN reports in inet_proto_csum_replace16 during OVS packet execution.

Typical attack path

  1. Craft IPv6 packet with malformed extension header lengths that exceed remaining skb data
  2. Deliver packet to an interface handled by Open vSwitch
  3. ovs_packet_cmd_execute / do_execute_actions calls set_ipv6_addr which invokes ipv6_find_hdr
  4. Invalid offset is written into the skbuff metadata
  5. inet_proto_csum_replace16 performs out-of-bounds read/write on the freed skbuff region

How to detect it

Search kernel logs and KASAN reports for the exact strings 'ipv6_find_hdr', 'inet_proto_csum_replace16', 'ovs_ipv6_oob', and 'slab-use-after-free' near skbuff_small_head allocations; inspect netlink and OVS packet execution paths for anomalous IPv6 traffic preceding the crash.

  • BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in inet_proto_csum_replace16
  • ovs_ipv6_oob
  • Read of size 2 at addr .* skbuff_small_head
  • ipv6_find_hdr.*offset past the packet end

What your security team should do

  • Immediately schedule kernel updates for all systems running Open vSwitch with IPv6 enabled
  • Add the published patch to internal kernel build pipelines and test in staging
  • Temporarily apply network ACLs that drop suspicious IPv6 extension header chains if patching is delayed
  • Increase monitoring for kernel oops and KASAN events on OVS hosts

The record

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: do not let ipv6_find_hdr() return an offset past the packet end ipv6_find_hdr() walks the extension header chain, skipping each header by the length that header itself declares. ipv6_optlen() returns up to 2048, and the skip is never checked against skb->len, so the offset stored in *offset can point past the end of the packet. openvswitch installs that offset as the transport header, and update_ipv6_checksum() then reads and writes the transport checksum field out of bounds: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in inet_proto_csum_replace16+0x445/0x470 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810b754b06 by task ovs_ipv6_oob/629 CPU: 4 UID: 1000 PID: 629 Comm: ovs_ipv6_oob Tainted: G N 7.3.0-rc3+ #348 Call Trace: inet_proto_csum_replace16+0x445/0x470 set_ipv6_addr+0x3dd/0x460 do_execute_actions+0x6a3d/0x7c40 ovs_execute_actions+0xfd/0x480 ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xc38/0xf20 genl_rcv_msg+0x59e/0x870 netlink_rcv_skb+0x18b/0x450 genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x6bc/0xa20 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810b754980 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 390 bytes inside of freed 704-byte region [ffff88810b754980, ffff88810b754c40) Other callers use that offset too, so bound it here rather than in one caller. Reject a header whose declared length does not fit in the packet. ipv6_find_hdr() already fails with -EBADMSG on a malformed chain, so this adds no new failure mode.

Affected packages

Ecosystem Package Introduced Fixed