Cloudanix VulnDB

CVE-2026-89627

None

CVSS

—

EPSS

0.2%

Published

Sep 11, 2026

CISA due date

—

Cloudanix analysis

Schedule a fix SSVC: Track

A Linux driver for some gaming mice and keyboards can waste a bit of system memory each time the device is unplugged, and repeating that over and over could slow or freeze the computer.

Exploitation
Physical Access
Attacker needs
Physical Access
Complexity
Moderate
Impact
Denial Of Service
Component
OS kernel
Class
Denial of service
Remediation
Upgrade
Effort
Medium
Patch risk
None

What it actually does

The Linux kernel HID Roccat driver leaks kernel memory on device teardown. HID reports are duplicated with kmemdup() into a circular buffer and are freed only when a slot is reused; destruction of struct roccat_device does not release remaining cbuf[] allocations. Each destroyed device can leak up to ROCCAT_CBUF_SIZE report buffers of unreclaimable kernel memory, enabling local resource exhaustion (DoS) rather than code execution or privilege escalation.

Why it matters to the business

Operational impact is narrow: only Linux systems that load the Roccat HID driver (typically gaming mice/keyboards) are in scope. Repeated plug/unplug or bind/unbind cycles can slowly grow kernel memory use and, in extreme churn, degrade performance or crash the host. The issue is not in CISA KEV, is not associated with ransomware, has no known exploit maturity, and is about 38 days old—treat as routine kernel hygiene except where Roccat devices are common on Linux workstations, kiosks, or labs. No downstream package prevalence or named threat actors were supplied.

How an attack unfolds

This is a local denial-of-service memory leak, not remote code execution. An attacker who can register a Roccat HID device and then destroy it—by physically attaching and removing compatible or spoofed USB HID hardware, or by forcing driver bind/unbind—leaves duplicated report buffers unreachable because they are never reused. Repeating that cycle accumulates slab allocations until the kernel is under memory pressure, which can cause allocation failures, the OOM killer, or instability. No public exploit activity, named APT groups, or ransomware campaigns are associated with this flaw.

How to fix it

Apply the upstream Linux kernel fix that adds a destructor to free every buffered report in cbuf[] before freeing struct roccat_device, and that uses it on both registered-device destruction paths. Upgrade to a distribution kernel that includes the HID roccat 'free buffered reports when destroying device' change. Exact fixed package versions were not provided; follow distro security advisories and kernel changelogs. Temporary mitigation: if Roccat peripherals are not required, blacklist or unload the Roccat HID driver so the leak path cannot run.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the running kernel changelog or source contains the Roccat destructor that frees buffered reports on device destruction. Verify with your distribution that the installed kernel package includes that HID: roccat fix. On hosts that do not need the hardware, confirm Roccat HID modules are not loaded. After patching, register-then-destroy cycles for a Roccat device should not leave growing kmalloc/slab usage attributable to leftover report buffers.

Typical attack path

  1. Gain local or physical access sufficient to present or control a Roccat-class HID device on a vulnerable Linux kernel
  2. Cause HID reports to be queued so the driver duplicates them into the circular buffer
  3. Trigger device destruction (unplug, unbind, or driver teardown) so remaining buffered reports are never reused and never freed
  4. Repeat register/destroy cycles to grow unreclaimable kernel allocations
  5. Induce or wait for kernel memory exhaustion resulting in denial of service

How to detect it

There are no reliable network or malware-style artifacts. Hunt for kernel memory growth correlated with Roccat HID connect/disconnect, USB attach/removal of Roccat-class devices, hid-roccat module load/unload, and OOM-killer or slab-pressure events on Linux desktops. Review dmesg and journal HID/USB logs around device destruction. Because exploit maturity is none and no threat actors are named, historical compromise is unlikely; focus on exposure (driver loaded, unpatched kernel) rather than assuming prior exploitation.

What your security team should do

  • Inventory Linux hosts that use Roccat HID gaming peripherals and patch those kernels first
  • Treat remaining Linux fleets as standard kernel-update hygiene; this is not KEV and has no known in-the-wild exploitation
  • If patching is delayed, blacklist the Roccat HID driver wherever those devices are not required
  • Watch kernel memory (slab/kmalloc) and OOM events on Linux desktops with high USB attach/detach churn
  • Track distribution kernel advisories for the HID roccat buffered-report free fix until exact package versions are published

The record

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: roccat: free buffered reports when destroying device roccat_report_event() duplicates each report with kmemdup() and stores the allocation in a circular-buffer slot. The allocation is released only when that slot is reused. The device destruction paths free struct roccat_device without releasing reports still stored in cbuf[]. This makes those allocations unreachable and leaks up to ROCCAT_CBUF_SIZE report buffers per device. Add a small destructor that frees every buffered report before freeing the device, and use it in both paths that can destroy a registered device.

Affected packages

Ecosystem Package Introduced Fixed