Cloudanix VulnDB

CVE-2026-80925

None

CVSS

—

EPSS

0.2%

Published

Sep 9, 2026

CISA due date

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Cloudanix analysis

Next patch cycle SSVC: Track

A flaw in the Linux kernel's network handling can cause systems to crash when certain virtual network settings are changed while traffic is flowing.

Exploitation
Local Privilege
Attacker needs
Local User
Complexity
Moderate
Impact
Denial Of Service
Component
OS kernel
Class
Race Condition
Remediation
Upgrade
Effort
Medium
Patch risk
Low

What it actually does

Dynamic mutation of dev->hard_header_len via vlan_transfer_features under RTNL creates data races in lockless TX paths (af_packet, ip6_finish_output2), allowing upper layers to reserve insufficient headroom based on stale values and triggering skb_under_panic in vlan_dev_hard_header; header_ops mismatch also occurs because hard_header_len changes without updating header creation logic.

Why it matters to the business

Unstable network stacks on Linux systems using VLAN devices can experience kernel panics during hardware offload toggling, leading to service disruption, connectivity loss, and potential downtime on servers or appliances handling VLAN traffic.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker with local or network access capable of toggling NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX or STAG_TX on a lower device while concurrent lockless transmissions occur can induce the race; upper-layer skb allocation then under-reserves headroom, causing panic on header insertion. No public exploitation or threat actor campaigns are known.

How to fix it

Update to a kernel containing the fix that unconditionally sets dev->hard_header_len = real_dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom = real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN, and always uses vlan_header_ops. Backport commits e16e960d55a4 and cef51860becd to stable trees as noted in the advisory.

How to confirm the fix worked

Inspect kernel source for the static assignment of hard_header_len and needed_headroom from the real device, confirm vlan_header_ops is used unconditionally, and test that toggling HW VLAN offload no longer mutates these values or produces panics under concurrent TX load.

Typical attack path

  1. Obtain ability to toggle hardware VLAN TX offload on a lower network device
  2. Trigger concurrent lockless TX paths (e.g., raw sockets or IPv6 output) while the toggle occurs
  3. Force upper layers to read stale hard_header_len and allocate undersized skbs
  4. Invoke vlan_dev_hard_header to trigger skb_under_panic

How to detect it

Search system and kernel logs (dmesg, /var/log/kern.log, journalctl) for skb_under_panic, vlan_dev_hard_header, or hard_header_len races; correlate with ethtool or netlink events that toggle VLAN offload features around the time of the panic.

What your security team should do

  • Prioritize kernel updates on systems exposing VLAN interfaces with hardware offload
  • Review and restrict unprivileged access to ethtool or netlink interfaces that toggle offload features
  • Monitor kernel logs for skb_under_panic and vlan-related oops until patched
  • Consider disabling HW VLAN offload on lower devices where feasible as a temporary mitigation

The record

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: fix skb_under_panic and races when toggling HW VLAN offload Toggling hardware VLAN TX offload (NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX or NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX) on a lower device invokes vlan_transfer_features(), which dynamically changed vlandev->hard_header_len. This causes two issues: 1. Lockless TX paths (e.g. packet_snd in af_packet.c, ip6_finish_output2) read dev->hard_header_len without holding RTNL lock. Mutating hard_header_len dynamically under RTNL creates a data race where upper layers reserve insufficient headroom based on a stale hard_header_len, resulting in skb_under_panic when vlan_dev_hard_header() is called. 2. In addition, vlan_transfer_features() updated hard_header_len without updating header_ops, causing a mismatch between allocated headroom and header creation. Always setting dev->hard_header_len = real_dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom = real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN unconditionally ensures: - dev->hard_header_len remains 100% static and immutable at real_dev->hard_header_len, eliminating all dynamic runtime updates and data races on hard_header_len. - Upper layers allocating skbs via LL_RESERVED_SPACE() will always reserve sufficient headroom for software VLAN tag insertion (real_dev->hard_header_len + real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN). - vlandev inherits real_dev->needed_tailroom so underlying trailer/padding/ICV requirements are honored. - AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW network header offsets remain correctly aligned at real_dev->hard_header_len. - vlan_header_ops is used unconditionally. Note to stable teams: Make sure to backport these commits: e16e960d55a4 ("ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev") cef51860becd ("macvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from lowerdev")

Affected packages

Ecosystem Package Introduced Fixed