CVE-2026-80847
NoneCVSS
—
EPSS
0.2%
Published
Sep 4, 2026
CISA due date
—
Cloudanix analysis
A flaw in the Linux kernel's handling of network connection sizes could let attackers crash affected computers by sending specially crafted network settings.
- Exploitation
- Local Privilege
- Attacker needs
- Local User
- Complexity
- Moderate
- Impact
- Denial Of Service
- Component
- OS kernel
- Class
- Improper Input Validation
- Remediation
- Upgrade
- Effort
- Medium
- Patch risk
- Low
What it actually does
Divide-by-zero in tcp_select_initial_window when route-derived advmss drops below TCP_MIN_MSS, reachable via explicit RTAX_ADVMSS or default advmss path driven by MTU and min_adv_mss.
Why it matters to the business
Linux-based systems may experience kernel crashes or denial of service, leading to unplanned downtime and service disruption, especially on network-facing servers.
How an attack unfolds
An attacker crafts network routes or MTU settings that force an advmss value smaller than one, triggering the divide-by-zero during TCP initial window selection when a connection is established.
How to fix it
Upgrade the Linux kernel to a version containing the tcp_dst_advmss helper that clamps advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS before use in TCP paths.
How to confirm the fix worked
Verify the presence of the tcp_dst_advmss clamping logic in the kernel source or confirm the patched kernel version is running; test route configurations that previously produced sub-TCP_MIN_MSS advmss values.
Typical attack path
- Configure malicious route metrics or MTU values on a path to the target
- Trigger TCP connection initiation that invokes tcp_select_initial_window
- Cause kernel division by zero resulting in panic or crash
How to detect it
Search kernel logs and crash dumps for oops or panic messages referencing tcp_select_initial_window or division by zero during TCP window calculation; inspect recent route or MTU changes preceding the event.
What your security team should do
- Apply the kernel patch or upgrade to a fixed release as soon as available
- Monitor kernel logs for divide-by-zero oops in TCP stack functions
- Restrict untrusted route advertisement or MTU manipulation where feasible
The record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: clamp route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS tcp_select_initial_window() assumes that callers never pass an MSS smaller than 1, but route-derived advmss values can violate that assumption. A too-small explicit RTAX_ADVMSS is one way to get there, but it is not the only one. The same divide-by-zero can also be reached through the "default advmss" path when RTAX_ADVMSS is left at 0 and the effective advmss is later driven down by route MTU and min_adv_mss. Introduce a tcp_dst_advmss() helper that clamps route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS before TCP consumes it, and use it in the TCP paths that derive advmss from dst metrics. This keeps the effective MSS from dropping to zero before tcp_select_initial_window() rounds the receive window.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Introduced | Fixed |
|---|