CVE-2026-80765
NoneCVSS
—
EPSS
0.2%
Published
Sep 4, 2026
CISA due date
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Cloudanix analysis
A bug in how Linux inside a virtual machine reads certain setup messages from its Windows host can let that host crash the Linux system.
- Exploitation
- Other
- Attacker needs
- Other
- Complexity
- Trivial
- Impact
- Denial Of Service
- Component
- OS kernel
- Class
- Improper Input Validation
- Remediation
- Upgrade
- Effort
- Medium
- Patch risk
- Low
What it actually does
Missing bounds validation in mousevsc_on_receive_device_info allows a short VMBus SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO packet to supply oversized bLength/wDescriptorLength values, causing the guest kernel to read past the received packet buffer while copying the HID report descriptor.
Why it matters to the business
A malicious or compromised Hyper-V host can trigger denial-of-service crashes in Linux guest kernels, disrupting workloads that rely on virtual HID devices and requiring manual recovery or reboot.
How an attack unfolds
The attacker controls the Hyper-V host or backend and crafts a SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO message whose reported descriptor lengths exceed the actual packet size; when the guest parses the message it performs an out-of-bounds read, resulting in a kernel panic.
How to fix it
Apply the upstream kernel patch that passes the received packet size into the HID descriptor parser and rejects lengths exceeding the packet; rebuild and deploy the fixed kernel to all Hyper-V Linux guests.
How to confirm the fix worked
Confirm the presence of the bounds check that compares wDescriptorLength against the supplied initial-device-info size before copying; test by replaying a short oversized packet and verifying the guest rejects it without crashing.
Typical attack path
- Gain control of the Hyper-V host or synthetic HID backend
- Send a malformed VMBus packet containing SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO with inflated descriptor lengths but truncated payload
- Trigger mousevsc_on_receive_device_info in the guest kernel
- Cause out-of-bounds memory read and guest kernel crash
How to detect it
Monitor kernel logs for oops/panic entries referencing mousevsc_on_receive_device_info or hyperv HID descriptor parsing; inspect VMBus traffic for SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO messages whose declared lengths exceed observed packet size.
- mousevsc_on_receive_device_info
- SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO
What your security team should do
- Prioritize kernel updates on all Linux guests running under Hyper-V within the next maintenance window
- Enable kernel panic logging and watchdog monitoring to detect HID-related crashes quickly
- Review hypervisor hardening and isolation controls to reduce the chance of a compromised host reaching guest VMBus channels
The record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hyperv: validate initial device info bounds The Hyper-V synthetic HID host supplies SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO messages that contain a HID descriptor followed by the report descriptor bytes. mousevsc_on_receive_device_info() trusts bLength and wDescriptorLength without checking that the received packet contains both byte ranges. A malformed host or backend message can therefore make the guest read past the received VMBus packet while copying the report descriptor. Pass the received initial-device-info size into the parser and reject descriptor lengths that exceed the packet. Impact: A malicious Hyper-V host or backend can crash a guest by sending a short initial device-info message with an oversized HID report descriptor length.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Introduced | Fixed |
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