Cloudanix VulnDB

CVE-2026-73073

None

CVSS

—

EPSS

0.2%

Published

Aug 18, 2026

CISA due date

—

Cloudanix analysis

Monitor only SSVC: Track

A text editor used by many developers can be tricked into running attacker-chosen commands when a user tries to auto-complete code while reading a specially prepared file list.

Exploitation
Requires User Interaction
Attacker needs
User Interaction
Complexity
Moderate
Impact
Full Compromise
Component
Application
Class
RCE
Remediation
Upgrade
Effort
Medium
Patch risk
Low

What it actually does

Constructs and executes a vimgrep command with an insufficiently escaped typeref or typename value from a tags file, permitting an unterminated collection and command separator to run arbitrary Ex commands and operating-system commands during CTRL-X CTRL-O omni-completion.

Why it matters to the business

Attackers can achieve code execution on developer workstations or build systems that rely on Vim for editing code, leading to potential supply-chain compromise or data theft with moderate urgency given the 68-day publication window and low but present EPSS.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker plants a malicious tags file containing a crafted typeref or typename value with an unterminated collection followed by a command separator; when a victim opens a source file and triggers C omni-completion on a member whose type resolves from that tags file, Vim executes the injected Ex and OS commands.

How to fix it

Upgrade vim-main on Red Hat systems to version 9.2.967-1.1.hum1 or later (RHSA-2026:57614). Disable C omni-completion or avoid untrusted tags files until patched.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the installed Vim version is 9.2.0845 or newer; test that omni-completion on a member whose type is defined in a tags file containing a crafted typeref value no longer executes injected commands.

Typical attack path

  1. Generate or modify a tags file with a malicious typeref/typename entry
  2. Place the tags file in a location Vim will read for the target source file
  3. Trick or wait for the victim to open the source file in Vim
  4. Victim invokes CTRL-X CTRL-O on a member access whose type resolves from the tags file
  5. Vim executes the attacker-supplied Ex and operating-system commands

How to detect it

Review shell history, Vim command-line logs, and process execution records for unexpected vimgrep invocations or Ex commands originating from tags-driven completion; inspect recently created or modified tags files for suspicious typeref patterns.

What your security team should do

  • Apply the Red Hat update to 9.2.967-1.1.hum1 immediately on all affected systems
  • Audit and regenerate any tags files sourced from untrusted repositories
  • Consider disabling omni-completion (set completeopt-=omnifunc) for users who handle external codebases until patches are deployed
  • Monitor for new EPSS increases or KEV inclusion

The record

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0845, StructMembers() in runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim constructs and executes a vimgrep command using an insufficiently escaped typeref: or typename: value from a tags file, allowing an unterminated collection followed by a command separator to execute arbitrary Ex and operating-system commands when a user invokes C omni-completion with CTRL-X CTRL-O on a member access whose type is resolved from that tags file. This issue is fixed in version 9.2.0845.

Affected packages

Ecosystem Package Introduced Fixed

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