CVE-2026-68351
NoneCVSS
—
EPSS
0.2%
Published
Aug 10, 2026
CISA due date
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Cloudanix analysis
A wireless driver in Linux could read more memory than intended when talking to its own hardware, which might leak data or cause crashes until the kernel is updated.
- Exploitation
- Local Privilege
- Attacker needs
- Local User
- Complexity
- Moderate
- Impact
- Data Exposure
- Component
- OS kernel
- Class
- Buffer Overflow
- Remediation
- Upgrade
- Effort
- Medium
- Patch risk
- Low
What it actually does
Unbounded memcpy in carl9170_cmd_callback copies more data than the destination readbuf was allocated for when firmware-supplied len exceeds ar->readlen, resulting in an out-of-bounds read.
Why it matters to the business
Potential information disclosure or system instability on affected wireless devices; low exploitability and no known active campaigns reduce immediate operational risk, though kernel updates remain necessary for long-term device security.
How an attack unfolds
An attacker would need to compromise or emulate the carl9170 firmware to send a command response packet whose reported length exceeds the expected buffer size, triggering the fall-through memcpy that reads past allocated memory.
How to fix it
Update to a Linux kernel containing the bound memcpy change (min(len-4, ar->readlen)) in the carl9170 driver; apply vendor-supplied kernel packages as they become available.
How to confirm the fix worked
Confirm the patched source contains the min() bound on the memcpy argument; test by sending oversized firmware responses in a controlled environment and verify no out-of-bounds access occurs.
Typical attack path
- Gain control of or emulate the wireless firmware to craft malicious command responses
- Trigger a length-mismatch condition in carl9170_cmd_callback
- Cause the unbounded memcpy to perform an out-of-bounds read
- Observe resulting memory disclosure or induce repeated device restarts
How to detect it
Review kernel logs for carl9170 length-mismatch messages followed by restarts; examine USB or wireless traffic captures for anomalous command response lengths from the firmware.
What your security team should do
- Prioritize kernel updates for systems using carl9170 hardware once fixed packages are released
- Monitor upstream Linux kernel changelogs for the specific carl9170 fix commit
- Limit exposure by disabling the driver on systems where the hardware is not required
The record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: carl9170: bound memcpy length in cmd callback to prevent OOB read When the firmware sends a command response with a length mismatch, carl9170_cmd_callback() logs the mismatch and calls carl9170_restart() but then falls through to memcpy(ar->readbuf, buffer + 4, len - 4). Since len comes from the firmware and can exceed ar->readlen, this copies more data than the readbuf was allocated for. Bound the memcpy to min(len - 4, ar->readlen) so that the response is still completed -- avoiding repeated restarts from queued garbage -- while preventing an overread past the response buffer.
Affected packages
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