CVE-2026-68315
High · 7.5CVSS
7.5
EPSS
0.5%
Published
Aug 10, 2026
CISA due date
—
Cloudanix analysis
A bug in the Linux kernel's handling of certain network reset messages can crash the entire system when received over special high-capacity network links.
- Exploitation
- Remote Unauthenticated
- Attacker needs
- None
- Complexity
- Low
- Impact
- Denial Of Service
- Component
- OS kernel
- Class
- Improper Input Validation
- Remediation
- Patch
- Effort
- Medium
- Patch risk
- Low
What it actually does
Improper validation of stream count in sctp_process_strreset_inreq allows a crafted SCTP RESET_IN_REQUEST to trigger a __u16 size overflow when generating the corresponding RESET_OUT_REQUEST on high-MTU interfaces, resulting in undersized skb allocation and kernel panic via skb_panic/skb_put.
Why it matters to the business
Systems using SCTP over jumbo-frame or loopback IPv6 interfaces can experience sudden kernel crashes and service outages; the low EPSS and absence from KEV indicate limited current exploitation risk but still require prompt remediation to avoid denial-of-service impact.
How an attack unfolds
An attacker establishes an SCTP association and sends a RESET_IN_REQUEST parameter whose length encodes a stream count that is valid for the 8-byte IN header yet produces an OUT request exceeding SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN; on high-MTU paths the kernel proceeds to allocate an undersized skb in sctp_make_strreset_req and panics.
How to fix it
Apply the upstream kernel patch that rejects peer IN requests whose corresponding OUT request would exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN and tightens the local setsockopt check; rebuild and reboot with the fixed kernel image.
How to confirm the fix worked
Confirm the patched kernel contains the validation check in sctp_process_strreset_inreq and sctp_make_strreset_req; replay a boundary-case RESET_IN_REQUEST over a jumbo MTU interface and verify the request is rejected without panic.
Typical attack path
- Establish SCTP association with target
- Craft RESET_IN_REQUEST with stream list sized to fit IN parameter but overflow OUT calculation
- Transmit request over high-MTU path (IPv6 jumbogram or loopback)
- Kernel processes request in sctp_process_strreset_inreq and calls sctp_make_strreset_req
- Undersized skb triggers skb_panic and kernel BUG
How to detect it
Search kernel logs for skb_panic, skb_put failures, or stack traces containing sctp_process_strreset_inreq and sctp_make_strreset_req; inspect SCTP INIT/ASCNF chunks and subsequent STR_RESET chunks for unusually large stream parameters on high-MTU interfaces.
- skb_panic
- sctp_make_strreset_req
- sctp_process_strreset_inreq
- sctp_addto_chunk
What your security team should do
- Prioritize kernel updates for all systems exposing SCTP on high-MTU interfaces
- Restrict SCTP traffic to trusted peers until patches are deployed
- Monitor kernel logs for skb_panic or sctp_make_strreset_req crashes
- Review EPSS trend and re-assess after 30 days if score rises
The record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate stream count in sctp_process_strreset_inreq() When processing a RESET_IN_REQUEST from a peer, sctp_process_strreset_inreq() derives the stream count from the parameter length but does not check whether the resulting RESET_OUT_REQUEST would exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. The OUT request header (sctp_strreset_outreq, 16 bytes) is 8 bytes larger than the IN request header (sctp_strreset_inreq, 8 bytes). Generally, the IP payload is bounded to 65535 bytes, so the stream list cannot be large enough to trigger the overflow. However, on interfaces with MTU > 65535 (e.g., loopback with IPv6 jumbograms), a stream list that fits within the incoming IN parameter can cause a __u16 overflow in sctp_make_strreset_req() when computing the OUT request size, leading to an undersized skb allocation and a kernel BUG: net/core/skbuff.c:207 skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:2625 skb_put net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1535 sctp_addto_chunk net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:3695 sctp_make_strreset_req net/sctp/stream.c:655 sctp_process_strreset_inreq The local setsockopt path validates the generated reset request size. However, for an incoming-only reset, it accounts for the smaller IN request even though the peer must generate an OUT request with the same stream list. Such a request cannot be completed successfully by the peer. Reject peer IN requests whose corresponding OUT request would exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. Also tighten the local check so it does not send an IN request that would require an oversized OUT request from the peer.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Introduced | Fixed |
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