Cloudanix VulnDB

CVE-2026-53208

None

CVSS

—

EPSS

0.1%

Published

Jun 25, 2026

CISA due date

—

Cloudanix analysis

Next patch cycle SSVC: Track

A nearby attacker could disrupt Bluetooth on affected Linux devices by sending specially crafted wireless packets, even without pairing first.

Exploitation
Adjacent Network
Attacker needs
None
Complexity
Low
Impact
Denial Of Service
Component
OS kernel
Class
Denial of service
Remediation
Patch
Effort
Low
Patch risk
Low

What it actually does

The flaw is in the Linux kernel Bluetooth L2CAP BR/EDR signaling path. The kernel accepted fixed-channel signaling packets on CID 0x0001 up to the channel MTU instead of enforcing the smaller BR/EDR signaling MTU. A nearby unauthenticated Bluetooth BR/EDR peer could send an oversized signaling packet containing many packed L2CAP Echo Request commands before pairing. Vulnerable kernels would parse and dispatch the commands and transmit many Echo Response frames, creating a local radio/resource amplification condition. The practical impact is denial of service or Bluetooth performance degradation rather than code execution or privilege escalation.

Why it matters to the business

Systems with enabled Bluetooth BR/EDR may be susceptible to short-range disruption from an attacker physically near the device. The likely business effect is degraded Bluetooth connectivity, increased radio traffic, battery drain on mobile or embedded devices, and potential interference with Bluetooth-dependent peripherals or workflows. The issue is not listed in CISA KEV, is not known to be used in ransomware campaigns, and has a low EPSS score, so urgency is highest for fleets where Bluetooth is enabled in public, shared, industrial, healthcare, retail, or kiosk-like locations.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker must be within Bluetooth radio range of a vulnerable Linux system with BR/EDR Bluetooth enabled. Pairing or prior trust is not required. The attacker sends an L2CAP fixed-channel signaling packet to CID 0x0001 that exceeds the intended BR/EDR signaling MTU and packs many L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands into the same packet. Because vulnerable kernels process the oversized signaling packet command-by-command, the target emits a corresponding burst of L2CAP_ECHO_RSP frames. Repeating this traffic can consume Bluetooth airtime, trigger excessive kernel Bluetooth processing, degrade nearby Bluetooth communications, and potentially drain battery on portable targets. Fixed kernels reject oversized BR/EDR signaling packets before dispatching embedded commands and send a single command reject response instead of many echo responses.

How to fix it

Apply the Linux kernel update from the relevant distribution or device vendor that includes the L2CAP BR/EDR signaling MTU enforcement fix. Because no product-specific fixed versions were provided, track the vendor advisory for the exact kernel package release containing the fix for CVE-2026-53208. Where immediate patching is not possible, reduce exposure by disabling Bluetooth, disabling BR/EDR/classic Bluetooth when feasible, blocking Bluetooth service on devices that do not require it, limiting use in untrusted physical areas, and applying endpoint or device management policy to keep Bluetooth off by default. For embedded or appliance products, obtain firmware updates from the OEM because the vulnerable code resides in the kernel, not in an application package.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the running kernel includes the vendor fix that rejects BR/EDR signaling packets larger than MTUsig before command dispatch. Validate package state with the operating system package manager and confirm the active booted kernel is the patched version, not only that the package is installed. If testing in a controlled lab, use Bluetooth packet capture tooling such as btmon, hcidump, or an external Bluetooth sniffer to send or observe an oversized CID 0x0001 L2CAP signaling packet. A fixed system should not emit one Echo Response per embedded Echo Request; it should reject the oversized signaling packet with a single command reject response or otherwise avoid processing the packed commands. Also verify that Bluetooth is disabled or policy-restricted on systems where mitigation rather than patching is used.

Typical attack path

  1. Identify a Linux-based target with Bluetooth enabled and discoverable or otherwise reachable over BR/EDR radio range.
  2. Establish enough BR/EDR connectivity to send L2CAP signaling traffic without pairing.
  3. Send an oversized L2CAP signaling packet on fixed channel CID 0x0001 that exceeds the BR/EDR signaling MTU.
  4. Pack the packet with many zero-length L2CAP Echo Request commands.
  5. Cause the vulnerable kernel to dispatch each embedded request and transmit many Echo Response frames.
  6. Repeat the traffic to create Bluetooth airtime congestion, resource consumption, battery drain, or degraded peripheral connectivity.

How to detect it

Retrospective detection is difficult because typical Linux systems do not log individual Bluetooth L2CAP signaling packets by default. Review available Bluetooth controller captures, btmon or hcidump logs, EDR telemetry that records Bluetooth activity, kernel Bluetooth debug logs if enabled, and helpdesk reports of localized Bluetooth disruption. Look for oversized BR/EDR L2CAP signaling packets on CID 0x0001 greater than 48 bytes, especially packets containing many L2CAP Echo Request commands followed by a burst of Echo Response frames from the target. Indicators include repeated zero-length Echo Request commands, an abnormal ratio of Echo Responses to normal Bluetooth control traffic, short bursts of many Echo Responses over hundreds of milliseconds, and recurrence from the same nearby Bluetooth address if observable. Since exploitation requires radio proximity, correlate suspicious packet captures with physical location, time-bound Bluetooth outages, battery drain, peripheral disconnects, or reports from multiple devices in the same area.

  • L2CAP Echo Request
  • L2CAP Echo Response
  • L2CAP_ECHO_REQ
  • L2CAP_ECHO_RSP
  • CID 0x0001
  • Channel: 0x0001
  • Signaling Channel
  • MTU Exceeded
  • L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED
  • Command Reject
  • code 0x08
  • code 0x09
  • zero-length Echo Request
  • BR/EDR signaling packet length > 48

What your security team should do

  • Inventory Linux endpoints, servers, appliances, kiosks, mobile/embedded devices, and IoT systems with Bluetooth enabled, prioritizing those in public or physically accessible areas.
  • Patch affected Linux kernels through the OS, device, or firmware vendor as soon as validated updates are available.
  • Disable Bluetooth or BR/EDR on systems that do not have a business requirement for classic Bluetooth connectivity.
  • For high-risk locations, monitor Bluetooth traffic for oversized L2CAP signaling packets and bursts of Echo Request/Echo Response traffic.
  • Prioritize remediation lower than internet-exposed remote-code-execution flaws but higher for battery-powered, safety-critical, kiosk, medical, retail, or industrial devices that rely on stable Bluetooth connectivity.
  • After patching, confirm the running kernel version changed and rebooted systems are no longer using the vulnerable kernel.
  • Educate field and operations teams that exploitation requires physical proximity, so suspicious localized Bluetooth outages or rapid battery drain may warrant on-site investigation.

The record

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject BR/EDR signaling packets over MTUsig net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() accepts BR/EDR signaling packets up to the channel MTU and dispatches each command without enforcing the signaling MTU (MTUsig). A Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range can send a fixed-channel CID 0x0001 packet that is larger than MTUsig and contains many L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands before pairing. In a real-radio stock-kernel run, one 681-byte signaling packet containing 168 zero-length ECHO_REQ commands made the target transmit 168 ECHO_RSP frames over about 220 ms. Impact: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range, before pairing, can force 168 ECHO_RSP frames from one 681-byte fixed-channel signaling packet containing packed ECHO_REQ commands. Define Linux's BR/EDR signaling MTU as the spec minimum of 48 bytes and reject any larger signaling packet with one L2CAP_COMMAND_REJECT_RSP carrying L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED before any command is dispatched. The Bluetooth Core spec wording for MTUExceeded says the reject identifier shall match the first request command in the packet, and that packets containing only responses shall be silently discarded. Linux intentionally deviates from that prescription: silently discarding desynchronizes the peer because the remote stack never learns its responses were dropped, and locating the first request command requires walking command headers past MTUsig, i.e. processing bytes from a packet we have already decided is too large to process. We therefore always emit one reject and use the identifier from the first command header, a single fixed-offset byte read. The unrestricted BR/EDR signaling parser and ECHO_REQ response path both trace to the initial git import; no later introducing commit is available for a Fixes tag.

Affected packages

Ecosystem Package Introduced Fixed