CVE-2026-53202

What it actually does

This is a Linux kernel buffer overflow in the Intel VPU accelerator driver IPC receive path. The driver receives a firmware-supplied unsigned data_size value, but casts it to a signed int before calculating the copy length. Values at or above 0x80000000 can become negative, then wrap back to a very large unsigned value during memcpy-style copying, allowing an oversized copy into a stack buffer. At minimum this can crash the kernel; depending on build options, memory layout, reachable attack surface, and exploit reliability, it may also create a path to kernel memory corruption and potential privilege escalation.

Why it matters to the business

Systems using the affected Linux kernel driver for Intel VPU/IVPU hardware may be exposed to kernel-level denial of service and, in higher-risk scenarios, local privilege escalation. A successful exploit could interrupt workloads, crash endpoints or servers, and potentially allow an attacker to gain elevated control over a host. Current exploitation signals are low: EPSS is 0.00143, it is not listed in CISA KEV, it is not marked as ransomware-used, and no exploit maturity is reported; however, kernel memory corruption issues should still be prioritized where the affected driver and hardware are present.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker first needs a system running a vulnerable Linux kernel with the IVPU accelerator driver active and a practical way to influence or trigger firmware IPC messages handled by the driver. The vulnerable code path processes a firmware-provided data_size field. By supplying or inducing a very large unsigned value, such as a value greater than or equal to 0x80000000, the value can be truncated into a negative signed integer during the min_t(int, ...) calculation. When that value is later used in an unsigned copy operation, it can wrap to an unexpectedly large length and overflow a stack buffer in kernel context. The most likely visible result is a kernel oops, panic, or device-driver crash. A more advanced exploit would attempt to shape the overflow to corrupt adjacent kernel stack data and gain code execution or privilege escalation, but no public exploit maturity is currently reported.

How to fix it

Upgrade to a Linux kernel version that includes the IVPU IPC receive fix replacing the signed min_t(int, ...) calculation with unsigned-safe min() handling. If distribution-specific fixed package versions are not yet listed, follow the relevant Linux distribution security advisory for this CVE and install the latest kernel security update when available. Reboot into the patched kernel after installation. Where immediate patching is not possible, reduce exposure by disabling or blacklisting the affected IVPU driver if the hardware functionality is not required, restricting local access to accelerator device nodes, preventing untrusted users or workloads from interacting with the device, and ensuring only trusted firmware is loaded.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the running kernel includes the upstream or distribution backport for the IVPU IPC receive fix. Validate that the installed kernel package version matches the fixed version from the operating system vendor once published. After reboot, verify the active kernel with uname -r and confirm the vulnerable driver is either patched, not loaded, or intentionally disabled. Check loaded modules and kernel configuration for IVPU support, review /dev accelerator device permissions where present, and inspect kernel logs for IVPU-related crashes before and after remediation. A system is still exposed if it is booted into an older vulnerable kernel even if a patched package has been installed but not activated by reboot.

Typical attack path

1. Identify a Linux host running a vulnerable kernel with the Intel IVPU/VPU accelerator driver present or loaded.
2. Obtain local execution, device access, or another path capable of triggering IVPU firmware IPC receive handling.
3. Cause the firmware IPC receive path to process a crafted or abnormal data_size value at or above 0x80000000.
4. Trigger the signed truncation and unsigned wraparound condition in the copy-length calculation.
5. Cause an oversized kernel memcpy operation into a stack buffer.
6. Use the resulting memory corruption to crash the kernel or attempt kernel-level privilege escalation.

How to detect it

To assess possible prior exploitation, review kernel and system logs for crashes or anomalies involving the IVPU/VPU driver, especially messages around firmware IPC receive handling, kernel oopses, stack corruption, oversized memory copies, general protection faults, or panics. Relevant log sources include journalctl -k, /var/log/kern.log, /var/log/messages, /var/log/syslog, persistent pstore/ramoops crash logs, kdump/vmcore artifacts, and EDR telemetry that records kernel crashes or suspicious local privilege escalation behavior. Look for repeated IVPU device resets or firmware errors followed by kernel faults. Also review local account and process activity around the time of any crash, because successful kernel exploitation may leave limited direct evidence beyond a crash, privilege change, or unexpected root-level process execution. There are no known public threat actors, KEV listing, or ransomware campaigns tied to this issue in the provided intelligence.

• ivpu
• intel_vpu
• accel/ivpu
• firmware IPC
• IPC receive
• data_size
• kernel BUG
• kernel oops
• general protection fault
• stack smashing detected
• stack corruption
• kernel panic
• Oops:
• BUG: unable to handle kernel
• /var/log/kern.log
• /var/log/messages
• /var/log/syslog
• /sys/module/ivpu
• /dev/accel

What your security team should do

• Inventory Linux systems for Intel IVPU/VPU hardware support and loaded ivpu-related kernel modules.
• Prioritize kernel updates on systems where the IVPU driver is present, loaded, or exposed to untrusted local users or workloads.
• Track distribution advisories for exact fixed kernel package versions and ensure systems reboot into the fixed kernel.
• If the accelerator is not required, disable or blacklist the IVPU driver as a compensating control.
• Restrict access to relevant accelerator device nodes to trusted users and services only.
• Monitor kernel logs for IVPU-related oops, panic, stack corruption, or firmware IPC receive errors.
• Because EPSS is currently low and the issue is not in KEV, prioritize based on driver presence and local multi-user or untrusted-workload exposure rather than internet exposure alone.