Cloudanix VulnDB

CVE-2026-53000

High · 7.8

CVSS

7.8

EPSS

0.2%

Published

Jun 24, 2026

CISA due date

—

Cloudanix analysis

Schedule a fix SSVC: Track

A flaw in some Linux kernels could let someone with local access crash a system or possibly gain higher privileges by abusing network filtering features.

Chainable
Exploitation
Local Privilege
Attacker needs
Low Privilege
Complexity
High
Impact
Denial Of Service
Component
OS kernel
Class
Race Condition
Remediation
Upgrade
Effort
Medium
Patch risk
Low

What it actually does

This is a Linux kernel netfilter/NAT race condition involving the lifetime of NAT hook operation structures. During NAT hook registration or cleanup, the kernel could free nf_hook_ops-related memory while another code path, such as nfnetlink hook-dump functionality, still has a concurrent read-side reference to it. The intended fix is to defer freeing with RCU semantics, preventing use-after-free conditions when netfilter hook metadata is inspected concurrently. Practical outcomes may include kernel memory corruption, kernel panic/denial of service, information exposure, or, in a worst case, local privilege escalation if an attacker can reliably shape and reuse freed kernel memory.

Why it matters to the business

Systems using affected Linux kernel versions may be exposed to local or namespace-assisted attacks that can destabilize hosts or potentially increase attacker privileges. The risk is currently lower than many remotely exploitable vulnerabilities because EPSS is low, there is no known CISA KEV listing, no known ransomware association, and no public exploit maturity is reported; however, kernel vulnerabilities can have high operational impact when exploited because they affect host stability and isolation boundaries. Organizations running multi-tenant Linux workloads, containers, untrusted local users, or systems permitting unprivileged user namespaces should prioritize review because attackers may be able to reach netfilter functionality from constrained contexts depending on distribution configuration.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker would first need local code execution or access to a context that can exercise netfilter/NAT hook registration and inspection paths, commonly requiring CAP_NET_ADMIN or equivalent privileges inside a network namespace. The attacker would then attempt to create, modify, dump, and tear down NAT/netfilter hooks in tight timing windows so that one kernel path frees NAT hook operation data while another path concurrently reads it through the hook-dump interface. If the race is won, the reader may dereference stale memory. A basic exploit would likely cause a kernel crash, while a more advanced exploit would attempt heap grooming so the freed memory is replaced with attacker-influenced data, potentially converting the use-after-free into controlled kernel memory corruption or privilege escalation. There are no named threat actors or active exploitation reports associated with this issue in the provided data.

How to fix it

Upgrade to a Linux kernel version that includes the upstream fix changing NAT hook operation cleanup to use RCU-deferred freeing, commonly represented by use of kfree_rcu for these objects. Because no exact fixed package versions were provided, use distribution advisories from the relevant Linux vendor and install the latest stable or long-term-support kernel update that references this CVE or the netfilter NAT kfree_rcu fix. If immediate patching is not possible, reduce exposure by restricting local shell access, limiting CAP_NET_ADMIN, disabling or tightly controlling unprivileged user namespaces where operationally feasible, limiting container privileges, avoiding privileged containers, and preventing untrusted workloads from manipulating iptables, nftables, or network namespaces.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm that the running kernel, not just the installed package, is updated to a vendor build containing the netfilter NAT RCU lifetime fix. Validate with the distribution package manager, kernel changelog, vendor advisory, or source commit history for references to netfilter NAT hook cleanup, nf_nat_register_fn, nfnetlink_hook, or kfree_rcu. Reboot into the patched kernel if required and verify with uname -a or equivalent inventory tooling. Also review host hardening posture: confirm unprivileged users cannot obtain unnecessary CAP_NET_ADMIN, containers are not running privileged unless required, and unprivileged user namespaces are disabled or restricted where compatible with business needs.

Typical attack path

  1. Obtain local execution on a Linux system, container, or namespace where netfilter/NAT operations can be invoked.
  2. Acquire or already possess CAP_NET_ADMIN-equivalent capability, often inside a network namespace if user namespaces are enabled.
  3. Repeatedly register, expose, dump, and unregister NAT/netfilter hooks while triggering error or teardown paths.
  4. Race the nfnetlink hook-dump reader against NAT hook cleanup so stale nf_hook_ops-related memory is accessed after free.
  5. Cause a kernel panic for denial of service, or attempt kernel heap grooming to turn the stale reference into memory corruption and possible privilege escalation.

How to detect it

Detection is difficult because exploitation occurs inside kernel memory and may leave no clean application-level artifact. Focus on host telemetry and kernel logs. Review dmesg, journald, /var/log/kern.log, /var/log/messages, auditd, EDR telemetry, and container runtime logs for netfilter, nf_nat, nfnetlink, RCU, use-after-free, general protection fault, kernel BUG, KASAN, slab, or panic messages around the time of suspicious activity. Look for repeated creation and deletion of network namespaces, frequent nftables/iptables changes, repeated netfilter hook dumps, unexpected use of CAP_NET_ADMIN by untrusted processes, or privileged container activity. In containerized environments, correlate crashes or kernel warnings with pods/containers granted NET_ADMIN or privileged mode. Absence of these artifacts does not prove non-exploitation, especially if the system was not configured to persist kernel logs across crashes.

  • nf_nat_register_fn
  • nfnetlink_hook
  • netfilter: nat
  • kfree_rcu
  • use-after-free
  • BUG: KASAN
  • KASAN: use-after-free
  • general protection fault
  • kernel BUG at net/netfilter
  • WARNING: CPU:
  • RCU-list traversed in non-reader section
  • nf_hook_ops
  • CAP_NET_ADMIN
  • unprivileged_userns_clone
  • iptables
  • nft

What your security team should do

  • Inventory Linux systems and container hosts running affected kernel branches, prioritizing internet-facing infrastructure, multi-tenant hosts, Kubernetes/container nodes, CI runners, bastion hosts, and systems with untrusted local users.
  • Apply vendor kernel updates that include the netfilter NAT kfree_rcu fix; ensure systems are rebooted into the corrected kernel.
  • Prioritize faster remediation for hosts allowing unprivileged user namespaces, privileged containers, or workloads with CAP_NET_ADMIN.
  • Temporarily restrict CAP_NET_ADMIN, privileged containers, nftables/iptables administration, and user namespace creation where business operations allow.
  • Monitor for unexplained kernel crashes, netfilter-related warnings, use-after-free reports, KASAN splats, and suspicious high-frequency namespace/netfilter manipulation.
  • Treat successful exploitation as a potential kernel compromise; if indicators suggest memory corruption or privilege escalation, isolate the host and perform forensic acquisition before rebuilding from trusted media.

The record

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nat: use kfree_rcu to release ops Florian Westphal says: "Historically this is not an issue, even for normal base hooks: the data path doesn't use the original nf_hook_ops that are used to register the callbacks. However, in v5.14 I added the ability to dump the active netfilter hooks from userspace. This code will peek back into the nf_hook_ops that are available at the tail of the pointer-array blob used by the datapath. The nat hooks are special, because they are called indirectly from the central nat dispatcher hook. They are currently invisible to the nfnl hook dump subsystem though. But once that changes the nat ops structures have to be deferred too." Update nf_nat_register_fn() to deal with partial exposition of the hooks from error path which can be also an issue for nfnetlink_hook.

Affected packages

Ecosystem Package Introduced Fixed

Related vulnerabilities