Cloudanix VulnDB

CVE-2026-47429

Critical · 9.8

CVSS

9.8

EPSS

0.9%

Published

Jul 14, 2026

CISA due date

—

Cloudanix analysis

Next patch cycle SSVC: Track

A security update is available for Prometheus, and organizations using the affected Red Hat package should upgrade to reduce the chance of monitoring systems being disrupted or misused.

Exploitation
Other
Attacker needs
None
Complexity
Low
Impact
Full Compromise
Component
Other
Class
Other
Remediation
Other
Effort
Medium
Patch risk
Medium

What it actually does

Public technical details for this issue are not available in the provided advisory data. The affected component is the Red Hat-packaged Prometheus 3.13 stream, with a fix provided in version 3.13.1-0.1.hum1 via RHSA-2026:39058. Until vendor details are available, treat the issue as a product-level security defect in Prometheus that could affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of monitoring services depending on deployment configuration and exposure.

Why it matters to the business

Prometheus often has visibility into infrastructure, application health, service names, labels, endpoints, and operational metrics. A security flaw in Prometheus could therefore create operational risk if monitoring is disrupted, manipulated, or used to reveal sensitive infrastructure information. Current exploitation likelihood appears low based on the supplied EPSS score, and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV, but organizations using the affected Red Hat package should still apply the vendor update through normal security patching processes.

How an attack unfolds

No public exploit behavior or vulnerability mechanics were provided. In a typical Prometheus exposure scenario, an attacker would first identify an internet- or internally reachable Prometheus service, determine the product/version from HTTP responses, package inventory, container image metadata, or exposed status endpoints, and then attempt to trigger the vulnerable code path if exploit details become available. Successful exploitation would depend on the unknown flaw class, Prometheus configuration, network reachability, authentication controls, and whether the affected Red Hat package version is present. Because exploit maturity is currently listed as none, defenders should focus on patch validation, exposure reduction, and monitoring for unusual access to Prometheus endpoints.

How to fix it

Upgrade the affected Red Hat package to the fixed release: prometheus3-13-main fixed in 3.13.1-0.1.hum1 as provided by RHSA-2026:39058. Use the standard Red Hat package management workflow for the relevant platform, then restart Prometheus if the service is not automatically restarted by the update process. Restrict network access to Prometheus web and API endpoints to trusted administrative networks, enforce authentication and authorization where available, and avoid exposing Prometheus directly to the internet. Review reverse proxy, firewall, Kubernetes ingress, and service mesh policies to ensure only intended clients can reach Prometheus.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the installed package version is at or above 3.13.1-0.1.hum1 for the Red Hat prometheus3-13-main stream. Validate using package inventory tools such as rpm, dnf, yum, Red Hat Insights, vulnerability scanners, container image scanners, or configuration management inventory. Confirm Prometheus has been restarted after upgrade and that the running binary corresponds to the patched package, not an older process still in memory. Re-scan exposed services and container images to ensure no vulnerable package versions remain in hosts, images, or downstream deployments.

Typical attack path

  1. Identify Prometheus services through network scanning, service discovery, exposed dashboards, HTTP banners, or internal reconnaissance.
  2. Determine whether the deployment uses the affected Red Hat prometheus3-13-main package stream and an unfixed version.
  3. Attempt to reach Prometheus API, query, status, metrics, or administrative endpoints depending on what is exposed.
  4. If exploit details become public, send crafted requests or inputs to the vulnerable Prometheus component.
  5. Use any resulting access, disruption, or information disclosure to map infrastructure, tamper with monitoring visibility, or support follow-on activity.

How to detect it

Because no exploit details or known threat actor activity were provided, detection should focus on signs of unusual interaction with Prometheus before remediation. Review Prometheus access logs, reverse proxy logs, ingress controller logs, load balancer logs, firewall logs, endpoint telemetry, and container runtime logs for unexpected source IPs, high request rates, unusual API usage, probing of status/debug endpoints, malformed requests, or access from non-administrative networks. If Prometheus is behind a proxy or ingress, correlate timestamps with Prometheus process logs for crashes, restarts, panics, abnormal memory or CPU spikes, and unexpected configuration reloads. Search for reconnaissance against Prometheus endpoints such as API, query, targets, status, flags, config, metrics, and service-discovery pages. Investigate any successful access from unfamiliar networks, especially if followed by broader infrastructure enumeration.

What your security team should do

  • Inventory all Prometheus deployments, including host packages, containers, Kubernetes workloads, appliances, and downstream monitoring bundles.
  • Prioritize upgrading Red Hat prometheus3-13-main to 3.13.1-0.1.hum1 or later via RHSA-2026:39058.
  • Reduce Prometheus network exposure by limiting access to trusted management networks, VPNs, bastion paths, or authenticated reverse proxies.
  • Verify that Prometheus API and web endpoints are not directly internet-exposed unless intentionally protected by strong access controls.
  • Monitor vendor advisories for newly published technical details, exploit code, or changes in exploit maturity.
  • Add the affected package stream and fixed version to vulnerability management exception/closure criteria so remediation can be measured accurately.

The record

Vitest is a testing framework powered by Vite. Prior to 3.2.5 and 4.1.0, the Vitest UI/API server on Windows used isFileServingAllowed incorrectly for /__vitest_attachment__, allowing \\?\\..\\ path traversal to read files outside the project; exposed API write and rerun features such as saveTestFile and rerun could also allow arbitrary script execution. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.5 and 4.1.0.

Affected packages

Ecosystem Package Introduced Fixed
npm vitest 0 3.2.6
npm vitest 4.0.0 4.1.0

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