Cloudanix VulnDB

CVE-2026-43073

Medium · 5.5

CVSS

5.5

EPSS

0.2%

Published

May 5, 2026

CISA due date

—

Cloudanix analysis

Schedule a fix SSVC: Track

A person who can already run code on an affected Linux system may be able to crash it, causing downtime.

Exploitation
Local Privilege
Attacker needs
Low Privilege
Complexity
Low
Impact
Denial Of Service
Component
OS kernel
Class
Denial of service
Remediation
Upgrade
Effort
Medium
Patch risk
Low

What it actually does

This is a local Linux kernel availability issue on x86-64 involving misuse of a specialized non-temporal memory copy routine that historically appeared to be a user-copy helper but was not a complete, safe user-access API by itself. A local, low-privileged actor able to reach an affected kernel or driver code path may be able to trigger improper memory-copy behavior, exception-handling edge cases, or fault handling in kernel context, causing a kernel oops, panic, hang, or other denial-of-service condition. The assessed impact is availability only; the provided data does not indicate confidentiality loss, data modification, privilege escalation, or remote unauthenticated exploitation.

Why it matters to the business

Successful exploitation could crash or destabilize affected Linux systems, interrupting applications, workloads, storage or interconnect-dependent services, and potentially requiring a reboot to restore service. The risk is most relevant on multi-user systems, container or workload-hosting platforms, and systems where untrusted local users or processes can exercise affected kernel paths. Current public risk signals are low: EPSS is approximately 0.00117 with no 30-day increase, there is no known CISA KEV listing, no ransomware association, and no mature public exploit reported; however, kernel availability flaws can still have high operational impact when they affect critical infrastructure.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker first needs local code execution or another way to invoke the affected kernel path from a local context. They then interact with a subsystem or driver path that uses the historically misleading copy routine, especially paths involving non-temporal destination copies and exception handling. By supplying inputs, memory mappings, buffer sizes, alignment, or access conditions that trigger fault-handling edge cases, the attacker attempts to make the kernel execute the vulnerable copy behavior in an unsafe context. If successful, the kernel may encounter an unhandled fault, oops, panic, or hang, resulting in denial of service. The vulnerability is not described as remotely exploitable and does not by itself provide code execution or privilege escalation.

How to fix it

Apply the Linux kernel fix from the relevant upstream, distribution, appliance, or cloud image vendor as soon as practical, prioritizing systems that allow untrusted local users, run shared workloads, or expose affected device/driver functionality. Because no exact fixed package versions were provided, use vendor advisories and kernel changelogs to identify builds that include the x86-64 copy-routine rename/prototype correction and the NTB caller update associated with this issue. Where immediate patching is not possible, reduce local attack surface: restrict shell access, limit untrusted workloads, disable or unload unnecessary affected drivers where operationally safe, restrict access to device nodes, and enforce least privilege for users and containers. Plan a reboot or live-patching process as required by the distribution, because kernel fixes generally do not take full effect until the running kernel is replaced.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm exposure by inventorying running Linux kernel versions and comparing them with vendor advisories or patched kernel builds that include the fix for this issue. Validate remediation by ensuring the active booted kernel, not only the installed package, is the patched version. Review loaded modules and hardware-dependent driver usage, especially NTB-related functionality, to determine whether the affected path is likely reachable. After patching, run normal workload and driver regression tests and verify that kernel logs no longer show crashes, oopses, or warnings associated with the affected copy path. For fleet validation, combine package inventory, running-kernel checks, and reboot-compliance reporting.

Typical attack path

  1. Obtain local, low-privileged execution on an affected Linux system.
  2. Identify whether the running kernel includes the affected x86-64 memory-copy implementation and whether reachable drivers or subsystems invoke it.
  3. Exercise the affected local kernel interface, device, or driver path with crafted memory mappings, buffer parameters, alignment, or size conditions.
  4. Trigger a kernel fault-handling edge case in the specialized memory-copy routine or its caller.
  5. Cause a kernel oops, panic, hang, or forced reboot, resulting in service disruption.

How to detect it

There are no unique public indicators of compromise for this issue in the provided data, and exploitation would likely resemble a local kernel crash rather than leave a distinctive file or network artifact. To assess possible prior exploitation, review kernel logs, system journal data, crash dumps, kdump/vmcore artifacts, console logs, and hypervisor or out-of-band management reset records for unexplained kernel oopses, panics, hangs, or reboots. Correlate crash times with local user sessions, process execution records, container events, device-node access, and driver activity, especially around NTB or other kernel paths that may use specialized memory-copy routines. Look for repeated crashes caused by the same local account, workload, container image, binary, or device interaction. If crash dumps are available, inspect stack traces for references to the affected x86-64 memory-copy routine or related driver callers. Absence of these artifacts does not prove non-exploitation, because denial-of-service events may leave limited evidence if logging is lost during a panic.

What your security team should do

  • Prioritize patching shared Linux hosts, multi-user servers, container hosts, CI runners, bastion systems, and systems where untrusted local code can run.
  • Track the applicable distribution or vendor advisory because fixed versions were not supplied in the input data.
  • Confirm that patched kernels are actually booted after installation; installed-but-not-running kernel updates do not remediate the active system.
  • Temporarily reduce local attack surface by limiting untrusted user access and disabling unnecessary affected drivers or device access where feasible.
  • Monitor kernel logs for unexplained oops, panic, machine-check, or NTB-related crashes until remediation is complete.
  • Treat repeated local crashes from the same user, process, container, or device interaction as suspicious even though no public exploit maturity is currently reported.
  • Use the low EPSS, lack of KEV status, and no known ransomware use to prioritize against more actively exploited issues, but do not ignore systems where availability is business-critical.

The record

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86-64: rename misleadingly named '__copy_user_nocache()' function This function was a masterclass in bad naming, for various historical reasons. It claimed to be a non-cached user copy. It is literally _neither_ of those things. It's a specialty memory copy routine that uses non-temporal stores for the destination (but not the source), and that does exception handling for both source and destination accesses. Also note that while it works for unaligned targets, any unaligned parts (whether at beginning or end) will not use non-temporal stores, since only words and quadwords can be non-temporal on x86. The exception handling means that it _can_ be used for user space accesses, but not on its own - it needs all the normal "start user space access" logic around it. But typically the user space access would be the source, not the non-temporal destination. That was the original intention of this, where the destination was some fragile persistent memory target that needed non-temporal stores in order to catch machine check exceptions synchronously and deal with them gracefully. Thus that non-descriptive name: one use case was to copy from user space into a non-cached kernel buffer. However, the existing users are a mix of that intended use-case, and a couple of random drivers that just did this as a performance tweak. Some of those random drivers then actively misused the user copying version (with STAC/CLAC and all) to do kernel copies without ever even caring about the exception handling, _just_ for the non-temporal destination. Rename it as a first small step to actually make it halfway sane, and change the prototype to be more normal: it doesn't take a user pointer unless the caller has done the proper conversion, and the argument size is the full size_t (it still won't actually copy more than 4GB in one go, but there's also no reason to silently truncate the size argument in the caller). Finally, use this now sanely named function in the NTB code, which mis-used a user copy version (with STAC/CLAC and all) of this interface despite it not actually being a user copy at all.

Affected packages

Ecosystem Package Introduced Fixed
openSUSE:Tumbleweed kernel-source 0 7.0.7-1.1

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