CVE-2025-46334

What it actually does

Due to Tcl's current-directory inclusion in the Windows executable search path, Git GUI invokes attacker-supplied sh.exe or textconv filter binaries from the repository root when the user selects Git Bash or Browse Files.

Why it matters to the business

Attackers can achieve arbitrary code execution on developer or operations workstations that interact with malicious repositories, enabling theft of source code, credentials, or lateral movement; the presence in widely used packages increases exposure across build and deployment pipelines.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker plants a malicious executable named sh.exe (or a textconv filter) in the root of a repository; when a victim clones the repository and uses the Git GUI menu on Windows, the insecure search path causes the malicious binary to be executed with the user's privileges.

How to fix it

Upgrade Git to one of the fixed releases 2.43.7, 2.44.4, 2.45.4, 2.46.4, 2.47.3, 2.48.2, 2.49.1 or 2.50.1; for the affected consul-k8s packages update to version 1.7.2-r1 (Chainguard or Wolfi) or later.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the installed Git or consul-k8s package version matches or exceeds the listed fixed releases; verify that repository directories no longer appear in the executable search path for GUI-launched processes.

Typical attack path

1. Create or modify a Git repository containing a malicious executable in its root directory
2. Host the repository on a platform the victim will clone
3. Victim clones the repository and opens it with Git GUI
4. Victim selects Git Bash or Browse Files from the menu
5. Malicious executable in the current directory is launched

How to detect it

Review process creation logs for executables launched from within cloned repository directories by git-gui or tclsh processes; correlate with recent Git clone activity and unexpected child processes such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe started from the repository root.

• git-gui.exe launching sh.exe from a .git or repository directory
• tclsh.exe executing binaries named astextplain or sh.exe from the current working directory

What your security team should do

• Immediately update all instances of the affected consul-k8s packages and Git installations to the fixed versions
• Restrict cloning of untrusted repositories on Windows developer workstations until patches are applied
• Monitor EPSS trend and reassess priority if exploit maturity changes