CVE-2024-52046

What it actually does

The ObjectSerializationDecoder performs unsafe Java native deserialization on incoming data via IoBuffer#getObject when an ObjectSerializationCodecFactory is present in the filter chain, allowing arbitrary object instantiation and code execution without class allow-listing.

Why it matters to the business

Applications using Apache MINA for network protocols face potential full server compromise through remote code execution, leading to data breaches, service disruption, and the need for urgent library upgrades plus configuration changes to restore secure operation.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker identifies a MINA-based service exposing a ProtocolCodecFilter with ObjectSerializationCodecFactory, crafts a malicious serialized Java object containing a gadget chain for code execution, and sends it over the network; the decoder deserializes it without restrictions, triggering RCE. No public exploitation or named threat actors are associated at this time.

How to fix it

Upgrade Apache MINA core to 2.0.27, 2.1.10, or 2.2.4. After upgrade, explicitly configure the ObjectSerializationDecoder with one of the accept methods (ClassNameMatcher, Pattern, or wildcard patterns) to permit only required classes; the default now rejects all classes.

How to confirm the fix worked

Verify the MINA core JAR version matches a fixed release, inspect application code for ObjectSerializationCodecFactory usage, and confirm that an accept method has been invoked on the decoder instance rather than relying on the insecure default.

Typical attack path

1. Locate MINA endpoints using ObjectSerializationCodecFactory in the codec filter chain
2. Craft a malicious serialized payload leveraging available Java gadgets
3. Transmit the payload to trigger IoBuffer#getObject deserialization
4. Achieve remote code execution on the target process

How to detect it

Review application logs for unexpected deserialization errors or class loading attempts from the MINA decoder; examine network traffic for large or anomalous serialized payloads targeting MINA ports; check process execution logs for unusual child processes spawned after MINA traffic.

What your security team should do

• Immediately audit all applications for use of ObjectSerializationCodecFactory or IoBuffer#getObject
• Upgrade to the specified fixed versions and implement explicit class allow-listing
• Replace ObjectSerializationCodecFactory with safer alternatives where possible
• Monitor EPSS trend and reassess exploit maturity as new information emerges