CVE-2024-27348

What it actually does

CVE-2024-27348 is a network-exploitable remote command execution vulnerability in Apache HugeGraph-Server versions 1.0.0 through versions before 1.3.0 when running on Java 8 or Java 11. The issue stems from insufficient access control around server-side graph/Gremlin functionality, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to submit crafted requests that cause the HugeGraph-Server process to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the service account. Successful exploitation can result in full compromise of the HugeGraph application server, including data theft, data manipulation, service disruption, lateral movement, and deployment of malware or backdoors.

Why it matters to the business

This is a critical, actively exploited internet-facing server vulnerability with a CVSS score of 9.8, EPSS probability of 0.9921, and inclusion in CISA KEV with a remediation due date of 2024-10-09. Organizations running vulnerable HugeGraph-Server instances should treat exposure as an urgent incident risk because attackers can take over the service without credentials, access or alter graph data, interrupt dependent applications, and use the server as a foothold for broader compromise. Although the KEV entry is not marked as ransomware-associated, active exploitation means delayed remediation materially increases operational and breach risk.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker first identifies an exposed Apache HugeGraph-Server instance, commonly by scanning for HugeGraph HTTP services and Gremlin-related endpoints. If the server is running a vulnerable release before 1.3.0 and authentication is not properly enabled, the attacker sends a crafted request to server-side graph execution functionality. The malicious payload abuses the server’s scripting or command execution path to invoke operating-system commands from inside the Java process. Once command execution succeeds, the attacker typically validates execution with a benign command, then downloads tooling, opens a reverse shell, installs persistence, steals data or credentials available to the HugeGraph process, and may pivot to adjacent systems reachable from the server.

How to fix it

Upgrade Apache HugeGraph-Server to version 1.3.0 or later, using Java 11 as recommended by the Apache project. For source-based deployments of apache/incubator-hugegraph, ensure the code includes fixed commit 6a4041e21c437b6e22d8a78e81f825bc0ab48a3d or a later trusted release. Enable the HugeGraph Auth system after upgrading; do not expose Gremlin or administrative APIs without authentication and authorization. Restrict HugeGraph-Server network access to trusted application tiers or administrative networks, block direct internet exposure, and place the service behind authenticated gateways where possible. If immediate upgrade is not possible, apply compensating controls: disable or restrict vulnerable script/Gremlin execution functionality where feasible, enforce firewall allowlists, block unauthenticated access at a reverse proxy, monitor aggressively for command-execution payloads, and plan emergency replacement of vulnerable instances. Because this vulnerability is actively exploited, exposed vulnerable servers should be investigated for compromise, not merely patched.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the running Apache HugeGraph-Server version is 1.3.0 or later and that Java 11 is used for the upgraded deployment. Validate that packaged or source deployments include commit 6a4041e21c437b6e22d8a78e81f825bc0ab48a3d or a later fixed commit. Review HugeGraph configuration to verify the Auth system is enabled and unauthenticated requests to graph execution, Gremlin, administrative, and REST endpoints are denied. From an untrusted network location, confirm the HugeGraph service is not directly reachable or only reachable through approved authenticated access paths. Check that requests to Gremlin-style endpoints without credentials return authorization errors rather than executing queries. Run vulnerability scans or configuration checks that specifically identify Apache HugeGraph-Server versions before 1.3.0. After remediation, review logs for pre-patch exploitation attempts and rotate any credentials, tokens, or secrets that may have been accessible to the HugeGraph process.

Typical attack path

1. Scan the internet or internal network for exposed Apache HugeGraph-Server services, especially HTTP APIs on common HugeGraph ports such as 8080.
2. Fingerprint the service version or test for exposed Gremlin/graph execution endpoints.
3. Send a crafted unauthenticated request to a vulnerable endpoint that causes the HugeGraph-Server Java process to execute operating-system commands.
4. Run basic reconnaissance commands such as whoami, id, uname, hostname, ipconfig, ifconfig, or env to confirm execution context.
5. Download and execute follow-on tooling using utilities such as curl, wget, bash, sh, PowerShell, or Python where available.
6. Establish persistence or an interactive shell, then enumerate application data, credentials, local files, cloud metadata, and network reachability.
7. Use the compromised server to exfiltrate data, modify graph contents, disrupt service, or pivot to other systems.

How to detect it

Investigate for prior exploitation by correlating HugeGraph application logs, HTTP access logs, reverse proxy/WAF logs, endpoint telemetry, process creation logs, EDR alerts, shell history, file creation events, and outbound network telemetry. Focus on POST requests to Gremlin or graph execution endpoints, especially unauthenticated requests or requests containing Java/Groovy command-execution strings. Review HugeGraph logs around suspicious API requests for exceptions, script evaluation messages, abnormal Gremlin submissions, or unexpected administrative activity. On hosts, look for the HugeGraph Java process spawning shell or utility child processes such as sh, bash, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, curl, wget, python, perl, nc, ncat, or chmod. Search for newly created executables, scripts, or archives in temporary directories and application working directories. Examine outbound connections from HugeGraph servers to unfamiliar IPs or domains, particularly connections immediately following Gremlin requests. Because exploitation is active in the wild and payloads vary, absence of a known IOC does not prove safety; prioritize behavioral evidence of Java-initiated command execution and unexpected network/file activity.

• POST /gremlin
• POST /graphs/
• /gremlin
• Runtime.getRuntime().exec
• java.lang.Runtime
• ProcessBuilder
• groovy.lang.GroovyShell
• javax.script.ScriptEngineManager
• cmd.exe /c
• powershell -enc
• powershell.exe -EncodedCommand
• /bin/bash -c
• /bin/sh -c
• bash -i
• sh -i
• curl http
• curl -o
• curl -O
• wget http
• wget -O
• chmod +x /tmp
• /tmp/.
• /var/tmp/.
• nc -e
• ncat -e
• python -c
• perl -e
• whoami
• uname -a
• id;
• java spawned bash
• java spawned sh
• java spawned cmd.exe
• java spawned powershell.exe

What your security team should do

• Immediately inventory all Apache HugeGraph-Server deployments, including source-built, containerized, and embedded instances.
• Prioritize remediation for any internet-exposed or untrusted-network-accessible HugeGraph-Server instance because the vulnerability is in CISA KEV and has a very high EPSS score.
• Upgrade to Apache HugeGraph-Server 1.3.0 or later on Java 11 and verify inclusion of fixed commit 6a4041e21c437b6e22d8a78e81f825bc0ab48a3d where source builds are used.
• Enable the HugeGraph Auth system and verify unauthenticated graph execution is blocked.
• Remove direct internet exposure; enforce firewall, security group, reverse proxy, or service mesh allowlists around HugeGraph APIs.
• Treat vulnerable exposed instances as potentially compromised: collect logs, preserve forensic artifacts, review process execution, and hunt for web-to-shell activity.
• Search historical logs for suspicious POST requests to Gremlin or graph execution endpoints containing command-execution primitives such as Runtime.getRuntime().exec, ProcessBuilder, curl, wget, bash, sh, powershell, or encoded payloads.
• Review outbound network connections from HugeGraph servers for unexpected destinations, especially shortly after suspicious API requests.
• Rotate secrets available to the HugeGraph service account, including database credentials, API tokens, cloud credentials, and application secrets, if compromise cannot be ruled out.
• Add SIEM detections for unauthenticated Gremlin execution attempts, suspicious Java child processes, and outbound downloader activity from HugeGraph hosts.