CVE-2024-2467

What it actually does

Timing side-channel in perl-Crypt-OpenSSL-RSA leaks information during PKCS#1v1.5 RSA decryption, enabling a Bleichenbacher-style oracle that recovers plaintext after many adaptive queries.

Why it matters to the business

Attackers may decrypt sensitive encrypted traffic or stored data protected by vulnerable RSA padding, leading to exposure of confidential information without direct key compromise.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker identifies a target using the vulnerable library for RSA decryption with PKCS#1v1.5 padding, then sends thousands of carefully crafted ciphertexts while measuring response timing differences to gradually recover the plaintext bytes.

How to fix it

Upgrade perl-Crypt-OpenSSL-RSA to a version with constant-time PKCS#1v1.5 handling or migrate to OAEP padding; disable legacy padding mode where possible until a fixed package release is available.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm package version is updated, perform timing analysis tests on decryption operations to verify absence of measurable side-channel leakage, and review code for PKCS#1v1.5 usage.

Typical attack path

1. Locate services or applications performing RSA decryption with perl-Crypt-OpenSSL-RSA and legacy PKCS#1v1.5 padding
2. Establish network access to submit large volumes of adaptive decryption queries
3. Measure timing variations across responses to build an oracle
4. Iteratively recover plaintext bytes through statistical analysis of timing data

How to detect it

Review application and network logs for unusually high volumes of RSA decryption requests from single sources; correlate with timing or error patterns that deviate from normal traffic baselines.

What your security team should do

• Inventory all uses of perl-Crypt-OpenSSL-RSA and PKCS#1v1.5 padding across the environment
• Prioritize migration to OAEP or other authenticated encryption schemes
• Monitor for package updates and apply them as soon as released
• Reduce exposure by limiting network-accessible RSA decryption endpoints