CVE-2024-23953

What it actually does

Non-constant-time signature comparison via Arrays.equals() in LlapSignerImpl permits byte-by-byte forgery of valid signatures for arbitrary messages by an authorized user, bypassing intended authorization checks on LLAP splits and work submissions.

Why it matters to the business

Authorized insiders could abuse the flaw to submit malicious work items, resulting in potential denial-of-service conditions that disrupt query processing and cluster availability; low exploitation likelihood reduces urgency but upgrade remains necessary for defense-in-depth.

How an attack unfolds

An authenticated attacker observes response timing differences from Arrays.equals() during signature validation, incrementally guesses each byte of a target signature, and submits forged LLAP work items that execute without elevated privileges, enabling resource exhaustion attacks.

How to fix it

Upgrade Apache Hive to version 4.0.0 (commit b418e3c9f479ba8e7d31e6470306111002ffa809) or later; for affected Red Hat packages upgrade resource-agents and related highavailability/resilientstorage components to 0:4.1.1-98.el8 or later. Replace non-constant-time comparisons with constant-time algorithms such as MessageDigest.isEqual().

How to confirm the fix worked

Verify deployed package versions against the listed fixed versions; review LlapSignerImpl source for replacement of Arrays.equals() with a constant-time comparator; test signature validation paths with timing analysis tools to confirm uniform comparison duration.

Typical attack path

1. Obtain valid low-privilege credentials for the Hive/LLAP service
2. Identify an endpoint or submission path that performs signature validation
3. Measure timing side-channel responses to craft a signature byte-by-byte
4. Submit forged work items or splits to LLAP
5. Trigger resource consumption or denial-of-service without requiring higher privileges

How to detect it

Review LLAP and Hive server logs for repeated signature validation attempts from the same low-privilege accounts, unusual timing patterns in authentication responses, or work submissions that bypass expected privilege checks; correlate with resource utilization spikes on LLAP daemons.

What your security team should do

• Apply the listed version upgrades to Apache Hive and Red Hat resource-agents packages within the next maintenance window
• Audit LLAP submission logs for anomalous work items from non-privileged accounts
• Implement network and application-layer rate limiting around LLAP endpoints as a compensating control
• Review any downstream dependents of the affected Hive packages for inherited exposure