CVE-2024-0507

What it actually does

This is a network-reachable command injection vulnerability that allows a user with an authenticated Management Console account holding the editor role to cause the server to execute unintended operating-system commands. Because exploitation requires only low privileges, no user interaction, and can affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability, successful exploitation may allow privilege escalation from limited console access to administrative control of the appliance or underlying host. The provided description identifies GitHub Enterprise Server Management Console as the affected component and notes fixes in GitHub Enterprise Server 3.11.3, 3.10.5, 3.9.8, and 3.8.13; the supplied package metadata also lists krb5/krb5 and Alpine krb5 packages with fixes at commit 55fbf435edbe2e92dd8101669b1ce7144bc96fef and Alpine 1.20.2-r1, so asset owners should verify the product context against their inventories and vendor advisories.

Why it matters to the business

If exploited, a user with limited management access could potentially take over the affected management appliance, alter configuration, access sensitive data, disrupt service availability, or use the system as a foothold for broader compromise. The CVSS score of 8.8 and EPSS score of 0.658 indicate high practical risk even though it is not currently listed in CISA KEV and no public exploit maturity is noted in the provided data. Because management interfaces often control critical source-code, identity, CI/CD, and administrative workflows, compromise can have outsized operational impact, including service interruption, credential exposure, repository tampering, and emergency recovery work.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker first obtains valid credentials for a Management Console account with the editor role, either through phishing, credential reuse, insider access, or compromise of an existing account. The attacker then accesses the vulnerable Management Console function and submits crafted input that is improperly passed to an operating-system command interpreter. The injected metacharacters or command payload cause the appliance to execute attacker-controlled commands with the privileges of the vulnerable backend process. From there, the attacker may enumerate the host, read configuration and secrets, create persistence, alter appliance settings, attempt to escalate further to full administrative control, and pivot to connected systems. No specific public exploit chain or named threat actor is provided, but the high EPSS suggests defenders should treat exposed or broadly accessible management consoles as priority remediation targets.

How to fix it

Upgrade affected GitHub Enterprise Server deployments to a fixed release: 3.11.3 or later, 3.10.5 or later, 3.9.8 or later, or 3.8.13 or later. If the affected asset inventory is based on the supplied package metadata, update krb5/krb5 to a version containing commit 55fbf435edbe2e92dd8101669b1ce7144bc96fef and Alpine v3.17 krb5 packages to 1.20.2-r1 or later. Until patching is complete, restrict Management Console access to trusted administrative networks, enforce MFA, remove unnecessary editor-role accounts, review and minimize Management Console privileges, monitor all editor-role activity, and block direct internet exposure of management interfaces. Treat credentials used by editor-role accounts as potentially exposed if suspicious activity is found.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the installed product version is at or above the fixed release for the relevant branch: GitHub Enterprise Server 3.11.3, 3.10.5, 3.9.8, or 3.8.13, or the applicable fixed krb5 package/commit where that metadata applies. Validate that no vulnerable versions remain in asset inventory, container images, AMIs/templates, backups intended for restoration, or package manifests. Confirm that Management Console access is restricted by network controls and that accounts with editor privileges are expected, MFA-protected, and recently reviewed. Where safe and authorized, run authenticated vulnerability checks or vendor-provided health checks to verify the vulnerability is no longer detected. Review change-management records and logs to ensure patch installation completed successfully and services were restarted or appliances were upgraded as required.

Typical attack path

1. Acquire or misuse credentials for a Management Console user account with the editor role.
2. Authenticate to the Management Console over the network.
3. Identify the vulnerable management workflow or parameter that reaches an operating-system command execution path.
4. Submit crafted input containing command-injection syntax or shell metacharacters.
5. Execute reconnaissance commands on the appliance to determine user context, filesystem layout, network access, and stored secrets.
6. Use the gained execution path to modify configuration, exfiltrate sensitive data, establish persistence, or disrupt services.
7. Attempt lateral movement using credentials, tokens, SSH keys, backups, or integrations accessible from the compromised appliance.

How to detect it

To determine whether exploitation already occurred, review Management Console authentication logs, authorization/audit logs, reverse proxy or web access logs, application logs, and host process-execution telemetry from the period before remediation. Focus on authenticated sessions by editor-role users, especially from unusual IP addresses, at unusual times, or followed by configuration changes, service restarts, new administrative users, SSH key changes, backup/export actions, or outbound network connections. Inspect request logs for shell metacharacters and command separators in Management Console parameters, including semicolons, pipes, backticks, dollar-parentheses command substitution, redirection operators, and chained commands. On the host, look for unexpected child processes spawned by management-console or web application services, such as shell interpreters, curl/wget, netcat, Python/Perl/Ruby one-liners, chmod/chown changes, archive utilities, or attempts to read secrets and configuration files. Correlate suspicious Management Console requests with endpoint telemetry, filesystem changes, new cron/systemd persistence, modified appliance configuration, and anomalous outbound DNS/HTTP/SSH traffic. No named threat actor, campaign-specific infrastructure, or public exploit artifact is provided in the input, so detections should emphasize behavior rather than static indicators.

• ;id
• ; whoami
• && whoami
• | whoami
• `whoami`
• $(whoami)
• /bin/sh -c
• /bin/bash -c
• curl http://
• wget http://
• nc -e
• ncat -e
• python -c
• perl -e
• ruby -e
• chmod +x
• /etc/cron.d/
• /var/spool/cron/
• /tmp/
• /var/tmp/
• ghe-config-apply
• management console

What your security team should do

• Prioritize patching or upgrading affected management appliances and packages because the vulnerability has high impact and a high EPSS score.
• Immediately inventory Management Console exposure and remove direct internet access where present.
• Audit all Management Console users with editor or higher privileges; disable stale accounts and enforce MFA.
• Review recent Management Console activity, especially actions by editor-role users before the patch was applied.
• Search logs for suspicious command-injection patterns, unexpected configuration changes, and anomalous child processes spawned by management-console services.
• Rotate credentials, tokens, SSH keys, and integration secrets accessible from the appliance if exploitation is suspected.
• Add detections for editor-role users performing unusual administrative actions, repeated failed attempts, or requests containing shell metacharacters.
• Verify fixed versions in golden images, disaster-recovery images, and downstream package repositories to prevent reintroduction.