CVE-2023-20864

What it actually does

VMware Aria Operations for Logs contains an unauthenticated network-reachable deserialization vulnerability that can allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the appliance. Because exploitation requires no authentication, no user interaction, and has low complexity, a vulnerable instance exposed to an attacker can be fully compromised, including confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the log-management platform and the data it stores.

Why it matters to the business

Successful exploitation can give an attacker complete control of a central logging platform, allowing them to steal sensitive log data, tamper with or delete evidence, deploy malware, pivot deeper into the environment, or disrupt security monitoring. The high CVSS score, high EPSS probability, and weaponized exploit maturity make this a high-urgency issue for organizations using VMware Aria Operations for Logs or deployments bundled through VMware Cloud Foundation, especially where the service is reachable from untrusted networks.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker first identifies a VMware Aria Operations for Logs instance reachable over the network. They then send specially crafted serialized data to the vulnerable service endpoint. When the appliance deserializes the malicious payload, attacker-controlled code is executed in the context of the affected service, resulting in arbitrary command execution as root. From there, the attacker can install web shells or backdoors, create persistence, access or exfiltrate stored logs, modify log records to hide activity, harvest credentials or tokens present in logs, and use the appliance’s network position to conduct lateral movement.

How to fix it

Upgrade VMware Aria Operations for Logs and any VMware Cloud Foundation deployment component that includes it to a vendor-fixed release. If exact fixed versions are not already identified in asset tooling, consult the applicable VMware security advisory for CVE-2023-20864 and apply the latest supported patched version for the installed product line. Until patching is complete, restrict network access to the appliance management and ingestion interfaces to trusted administrative and log-source networks only, block internet exposure, enforce segmentation, and monitor for anomalous requests and post-exploitation behavior. Because exploitation can provide root access, treat exposed vulnerable appliances as potentially compromised and consider credential rotation for secrets, tokens, and passwords that may have been logged or stored on the platform.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm remediation by verifying the installed VMware Aria Operations for Logs build against the VMware advisory and ensuring it is at or above a fixed release. Perform authenticated version checks where possible rather than relying only on banners. Validate that the appliance is not reachable from untrusted networks and that firewall or access-control rules limit access to required sources. Run vulnerability scans with updated plugins for CVE-2023-20864, review vendor health/status pages, and confirm that exploit attempts no longer trigger vulnerable behavior. After patching, inspect the appliance for persistence, unexpected files, unauthorized SSH keys, suspicious processes, modified startup scripts, and unexplained administrative changes.

Typical attack path

1. Scan for internet-facing or internally reachable VMware Aria Operations for Logs appliances.
2. Fingerprint the appliance version or service behavior to identify vulnerable deployments.
3. Send a crafted malicious serialized payload to the vulnerable network-accessible component.
4. Achieve arbitrary code execution as root on the appliance.
5. Run reconnaissance commands and collect configuration, credentials, tokens, and stored log data.
6. Establish persistence through scheduled tasks, startup scripts, SSH keys, modified services, or dropped binaries.
7. Tamper with logs or disable logging functions to conceal follow-on activity.
8. Pivot to adjacent systems using harvested credentials or trusted network access.

How to detect it

Review network, reverse proxy, load balancer, and appliance access logs for unusual requests to VMware Aria Operations for Logs services from untrusted IPs, especially requests containing serialized object payloads, abnormal binary content, long encoded parameters, or unexpected POST requests. Examine appliance system logs, audit logs, application logs, and shell histories for evidence of command execution, process spawning by the logging service, unexpected root activity, new files in temporary or web-accessible directories, modified startup scripts, cron entries, added SSH keys, and outbound connections to unfamiliar hosts. Because successful exploitation may allow log tampering, correlate appliance logs with upstream firewall, EDR, NetFlow, DNS, and proxy telemetry. Look for post-exploitation behavior such as curl/wget downloads, reverse shells, cryptocurrency miners, web shells, credential collection, and lateral movement from the appliance to directory services, virtualization management systems, or administrative endpoints.

• /storage/core/loginsight/
• /var/log/
• /tmp/
• /var/tmp/
• /etc/cron.d/
• /etc/crontab
• /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
• /home/loginsight/.ssh/authorized_keys
• /etc/rc.local
• /etc/systemd/system/
• /usr/bin/curl
• /usr/bin/wget
• /bin/bash -i
• /bin/sh -i
• nc -e
• ncat -e
• python -c 'import pty'
• perl -e
• chmod +x /tmp/
• curl http://
• wget http://
• curl -k
• POST
• java.io.ObjectInputStream
• rO0AB
• aced0005

What your security team should do

• Immediately inventory VMware Aria Operations for Logs and VMware Cloud Foundation deployments, including non-production and internally exposed instances.
• Prioritize emergency patching or upgrade of any reachable vulnerable appliance due to unauthenticated root remote code execution and weaponized exploit availability.
• Remove internet exposure and restrict access to trusted networks while remediation is in progress.
• Assume compromise for appliances that were exposed before patching; perform forensic review before returning them to full trust.
• Search historical logs and appliance filesystem artifacts for exploitation attempts, suspicious command execution, dropped files, new SSH keys, and log tampering.
• Rotate credentials, API tokens, certificates, and secrets that may have been stored in or transmitted through the logging platform.
• Increase monitoring for lateral movement from the appliance IP, including unusual outbound connections, authentication attempts, and administrative access to other systems.