CVE-2020-10808

What it actually does

Command injection in the schedule/backup Backup Listing Endpoint allows arbitrary command execution when a crafted filename containing shell metacharacters is processed.

Why it matters to the business

Successful exploitation grants attackers full control of the hosting server, enabling data theft, ransomware deployment, or persistent unauthorized access that disrupts operations and damages trust.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker first obtains limited file creation privileges such as via an FTP session, renames a file like .bash_logout to include a single quote followed by shell metacharacters, then triggers the vulnerable backup listing endpoint which passes the filename unsafely to a system shell.

How to fix it

Upgrade Vesta Control Panel to a version that properly sanitizes filenames before shell invocation; if no newer package is available, restrict FTP and web access, disable the backup module, or apply a vendor patch that escapes or validates input in the affected endpoint.

How to confirm the fix worked

Review the backup listing source for shell-escaping functions around filename handling, attempt to reproduce the injection with a test file containing safe metacharacters in a non-production instance, and confirm that the endpoint no longer executes injected commands.

Typical attack path

1. Obtain file write or rename capability on the server (e.g., via FTP)
2. Create or rename a file whose name contains shell metacharacters after a quote
3. Authenticate with low-privileged credentials to the web interface
4. Request the schedule/backup listing endpoint with a parameter referencing the crafted file
5. Execute arbitrary commands on the underlying host

How to detect it

Search web server access logs for requests to the schedule/backup endpoint containing unusual filename parameters, inspect FTP logs for rename operations that introduce single quotes or shell characters, and examine process execution logs or command history for unexpected shell activity originating from the VestaCP user context.

• .bash_logout'
• schedule/backup
• vesta
• bash_logout

What your security team should do

• Immediately restrict network access to the VestaCP web and FTP interfaces to trusted sources only
• Audit all existing backup filenames and scheduled jobs for suspicious entries containing quotes or metacharacters
• Monitor EPSS trend and exploit maturity; prioritize patching or decommissioning VestaCP instances given weaponized public exploits
• Replace VestaCP with a maintained control panel if the project remains unpatched