Cloudanix VulnDB

CVE-2003-1580

None

CVSS

—

EPSS

3.7%

Published

Feb 5, 2010

CISA due date

—

Cloudanix analysis

Schedule a fix SSVC: Track

A web-server logging problem can let attackers make requests appear to come from the wrong place, complicating efforts to identify and respond to suspicious activity.

Exploit Available
Exploitation
Remote Unauthenticated
Attacker needs
None
Complexity
Moderate
Impact
Data Tampering
Component
Network Service
Class
Improper Input Validation
Remediation
Upgrade
Effort
Medium
Patch risk
Low

What it actually does

The flaw permits spoofing of client IP addresses in access logs when DNS resolution for client IPs is enabled, because the logging format cannot distinguish unresolved dotted-quad addresses from legitimate resolved names, allowing crafted DNS responses containing numeric top-level domains to corrupt inverse-lookup results.

Why it matters to the business

Misleading or falsified client IP data in logs can impair incident response, forensic investigations, and compliance auditing, increasing the risk that malicious activity goes undetected or is misattributed.

How an attack unfolds

An attacker configures a malicious DNS server to return forged responses mapping numeric domains (such as 123.123.123.123) back to arbitrary IP addresses; when the server performs inverse DNS lookups for logging, the crafted response causes the server to record the spoofed IP instead of the true client address, as demonstrated in the original Inverse Lookup Log Corruption issue.

How to fix it

Upgrade prometheus-2.50 (Chainguard) to 2.50.1-r2 and prometheus-2.50 (Wolfi) to 2.50.1-r2; if DNS resolution for client IPs is not required, disable it in the logging configuration.

How to confirm the fix worked

Confirm the installed package version matches or exceeds the listed fixed releases; review logging configuration to verify DNS resolution is disabled or that the chosen log format explicitly records both resolved and unresolved addresses.

Typical attack path

  1. Enable DNS-based client IP resolution in server configuration
  2. Position a rogue DNS resolver that answers queries for numeric TLDs
  3. Send HTTP requests to the target server from the attacker-controlled IP
  4. Observe the attacker-chosen IP appearing in access or error logs instead of the real source

How to detect it

Search web-server access and error logs for entries containing purely numeric domain names or hostnames that match the pattern of forged numeric TLDs; correlate with DNS query logs for unexpected inverse-lookup traffic to numeric domains.

What your security team should do

  • Apply the listed package upgrades across all affected Prometheus deployments
  • Audit configurations and disable client-IP DNS resolution unless operationally necessary
  • Add log-format validation rules that flag numeric-only hostnames or unusual TLD patterns
  • Review historical logs for entries containing purely numeric domain names

The record

The Apache HTTP Server 2.0.44, when DNS resolution is enabled for client IP addresses, uses a logging format that does not identify whether a dotted quad represents an unresolved IP address, which allows remote attackers to spoof IP addresses via crafted DNS responses containing numerical top-level domains, as demonstrated by a forged 123.123.123.123 domain name, related to an "Inverse Lookup Log Corruption (ILLC)" issue.

Affected packages

Ecosystem Package Introduced Fixed
Debian:10 apache2 0 No fix
Debian:11 apache2 0 No fix
Debian:12 apache2 0 No fix
Debian:13 apache2 0 No fix

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